Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market by Ayres, Ian
BACK TO BASICS: REGULATING HOW CORPORATIONS
SPEAK TO THE MARKET
Ian Ayres*
N Monday October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Average
of New York Stock Exchange Listings dropped 508 points, a
decline of more than twenty-two percent of its value in a single day.
Two weeks later, on Monday, November 2, the United States
Supreme Court heard argument in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.1 Arguing
that stock markets efficiently reflect all public information concerning
price, former shareholders of Basic claimed that they had sold their
shares at an artificially depressed price because management had
denied falsely that the corporation was engaged in merger negotia-
tions.2 Although the shareholders did not know of the corporation's
statements at the time they sold their shares, and therefore could not
prove reliance in the traditional sense, they argued they could rely on
the integrity of the market to reflect such information. In the chaos
and continued fall in the stock market following Black Monday, it is
not surprising that at oral argument the defendant directors described
stock market efficiency as "a hypothesis that many people have ques-
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Wang provided helpful comments. Bernie Black, in particular, went beyond the call of duty in
improving the quality of an early manuscript. The support of Northwestern's Corporate
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1 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
2 Id. at 228. Basic Inc., a publicly traded company, made chemical refractories for the steel
industry. In September, 1976, Basic's officers and directors began extended merger
negotiations with representatives of Combustion Engineering, Inc. During 1977 and 1978,
Basic made three public statements falsely denying that it was engaged in merger negotiations.
On December 20, 1978, Basic announced that its board had approved Combustion's tender
offer for all of its outstanding shares. Id. at 226-28. Shareholders who sold Basic shares
between the time of the first public statement denying merger negotiations and the public
announcement of the tender offer brought suit claiming that Basic and its officers and directors
had violated Rule 10b-5.
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tioned in light of the events of the last few weeks."' 3 Notwithstanding
the market crash, a plurality of the Supreme Court ultimately
accepted the "fraud-on-the-market" basis for plaintiff standing under
Rule 10b-5.4
By allowing plaintiffs in class actions to claim a fraud-on-the-mar-
ket as a substitute for individualized proof of reliance on manage-
ment's false statements, the Basic decision has dramatically
reinvigorated the use of lOb-5 actions to attack corporate misrepre-
sentations. This Article addresses two issues at the core of the Basic
decision: (1) whether corporations should be allowed to lie to the mar-
ket; and (2) how different notions of stock market efficiency underlie
regulation of corporate speech and other aspects of corporate law.
Part I argues that corporations should be given the option of lying,
but that corporations that contemplate lying should be forced to dis-
close that they do not warrant the truth of their statements. Efficient
corporate law should not only give corporations the opportunity to
precommit to honesty, it should give them the opportunity to precom-
mit to silence, as well. When given these choices, market forces will
drive virtually all firms to commit to honesty, and at least some will
commit to (or establish reputations for) remaining silent.
Part II distinguishes between two independent dimensions of stock
market efficiency: A market is "informationally efficient" if certain
classes of information are immediately incorporated into a stock's
price; a market is "fundamentally efficient" if a stock's price reflects
only information relating to the net present value of the corporation's
3 Petitioners' Oral Argument at 17, Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (No. 86-
279).
4 Justice Harry Blackmun authored the plurality opinion which Justices William Brennan,
Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens joined. Justices Byron White and Sandra Day
O'Connor joined the Court's holding with regard to materiality, but dissented with regard to
the fraud-on-the-market issue. The Chief Justice and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony
Kennedy did not participate in the disposition of the case.
Upon subsequent reconsideration, the Court may erode the fraud-on-the-market doctrine
established by the Basic four-to-two plurality decision. The three Justices who recused
themselves in Basic have shown a general antipathy toward extending the private right of
action under lOb-5. Cf. R. Clark, Corporate Law 316 (1986) (stating that, in 1975, "the
Supreme Court, recently constituted to have a conservative majority, inaugurated a series of
securities law holdings whose common theme seemed to be that plaintiffs always lost").
Moreover, Justice Brennan's plurality vote may be changed by his replacement on the Court,
Justice David Souter.
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future profits.5 Part II first examines how informational and funda-
mental efficiency relate to the Supreme Court's analysis of fraud-on-
the-market theory. Second, it considers different beliefs about how
these two independent dimensions of market efficiency affect the fidu-
ciary relationship desired by shareholders and, consequently, a broad
spectrum of corporate regulation. If markets are not both informa-
tionally and fundamentally efficient, shareholders will want managers
to act in ways that would partially replicate their trading opportuni-
ties in a more efficient stock market.6
I. THE CORPORATE LIE
"To tell the truth is a duty; but it is a duty only in respect to one who
has a right to the truth."7
A. Default Choice
In an excellent recent article, Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller
argue that the fraud-on-the-market theory is theoretically defensible,
but that its application to the specific facts of Basic was wrong-
headed." Specifically, the authors assert that, from an ex ante per-
spective, shareholders will at times want their managers to lie.9 For
example, in Basic the false denials of merger negotiations may have
increased the likelihood of the merger and may have been beneficial to
5 Two earlier articles made the distinction between these two species of efficiency. See
Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 761, 766-72 (1985); Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market Is Not
Efficient, 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 341, 344-49 (1986).
6 The managers' role in trying to make the firm's stock behave as if it were trading in an
efficient capital market corresponds to the role of transactional lawyers in trying to
approximate a world without transaction costs. See Gilson, Value Creation by Business
Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 Yale L.J. 239, 243 (1984).
7 Constant, On Political Reactions, 1 France 123 (1797), quoted in I. Kant, Critique of
Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy 346 (L. Beck ed. and trans. 1949).
Immanuel Kant refutes this assertion in Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie for Altruistic
Motives, reprinted in I. Kant, supra, at 346.
8 Macey & Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the Market
Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1059 (1990). Macey and Miller are two of the leaders in analyzing
corporate governance issues. Although I criticize certain aspects of their discussion, I should
stress that I have benefited from reading not only their Stanford piece, but their other
contributions as well. Indeed, Macey's seminal contribution to takeover policy is at the core of
my criticism of his analysis of lOb-5 liability. See infra note 17.
9 Id. at 1069-70.
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shareholders generally.' ° For Macey and Miller, the ability of an effi-
cient market to reflect fraudulent corporate speech should not, by
itself, give shareholders a cause of action: even when shareholders rea-
sonably can rely on the workings of the market, managers should be
liable only if intentional misrepresentations also violate a contractu-
ally defined fiduciary duty to shareholders."
Furthermore, from the premise that courts should provide the
terms to the hypothetical corporate contract that the parties would
have wanted,' 2 the authors argue that even shareholders who explic-
itly rely on management misrepresentations should not have a cause
of action if the lie benefited shareholders as a class.' 3 For example,
lying about the positive finding from initial oil well drillings could
facilitate the corporation's purchase of surrounding lands at a low
price and thus benefit shareholders as a class, even though individual
shareholders may be harmed by selling their shares while the share
price is artificially depressed. Macey and Miller argue that sharehold-
ers, not knowing whether they would sell during one of these artifi-
cially induced depressions, would contract to allow such management
misrepresentations because they would be more likely to benefit from
the long-run increased share price.14
The authors overlook, however, the implications of being able to
contract around any standard-form fiduciary duty. Specifically, they
fail to appreciate the default nature of the fraud-on-the-market stand-
ard as a contractual provision. A "default rule" fills a gap in a con-
tract but can be contracted around to suit the preferences of the
parties.'5 An "immutable rule," by contrast, cannot be contracted
around; therefore, it governs all contracts.' 6
10 Id. at 1072.
11 Id. at 1071. In so arguing, they implicitly rely on the Supreme Court's analysis in
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (holding that there can be no lOb-5 liability
unless the insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose inside information or refrain from trading).
12 Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 1068-69.
13 Id. at 1072.
14 Id. at 1072. For a discussion of shareholder preferences as to short- versus long-run
share price maximization, see infra text accompanying notes 159-68.
15 Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 87 (1989).
16 Id. In the corporate context, for example, most states allow shareholders to contract
around the default of preemption rights in the corporation's articles of incorporation, but
minority appraisal rights are an immutable part of any corporate form of business. See Black,
Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U.L. Rev. 542 (1990);
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Macey and Miller do not state clearly whether their proposal to
allow managerial misrepresentation constitutes a default rule that
would enable shareholders to contract to prohibit such misrepresenta-
tion. 7 Assuming they intended their proposal to be a default rule,
their article also fails to address how corporations could contract
around the default. Nor does the article consider whether their
default choice would affect equilibrium contracting. Although most
of their analysis ignores the distinction between default and immuta-
ble rules, the possibility of contracting around a duty (or nonduty) of
honesty changes substantially the public policy analysis.
As an initial matter, any legal standard that condones corporate
prevarication must be a default. Even accepting the proposition that
shareholders will sometimes find it in their interest to allow their
managers to lie to the market (and to them), other circumstances will
occur in which it will be in the shareholders' interests to demand hon-
esty. In such circumstances, shareholders surely will want the option
of contractually committing their managers to honesty. Thus, share-
holders should have the option of warranting the honesty of their
managers' speech in the articles of incorporation.' 8 This simply
see generally Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L.
Rev. 1395 (1989) (discussing mandatory and enabling aspects of corporate law).
17 This is puzzling because Jon Macey has appreciated the implications of default rule
choice in other corporate contexts. See, e.g., Haddock, Macey & McChesney, Property Rights
in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 Va. L. Rev. 701, 733-37 (1987); Macey &
McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 Yale L.J. 13, 58-60 (1985).
18 Society may have an interest in constraining freedom of contract that leads to excessive
amounts of what economists call "signaling." See Ayres, The Possibility of Inefficient
Corporate Contracts, - U. Cin. L. Rev. - (forthcoming 1991); Rea, Arm-Breaking,
Consumer Credit and Personal Bankruptcy, 22 Econ. Inquiry 188, 196-97 (1984). For a
discussion of signaling in the corporate context, see infra text accompanying note 170. Society
might, for example, want to limit the ability of directors to signal their good faith by
contracting for criminal liability or corporal punishment if they breach a warranty of honesty.
The extent to which managers can contract for criminal liability under lOb-5 was left
unresolved by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Carpenter v. United States, 489 U.S. 19
(1987), which affirmed defendant Carpenter's lOb-5 conviction by an equally divided court.
Carpenter seems to establish only that there is at least a default duty not to trade on inside
information. See id. at 27 (stating that "'even in the absence of a written contract, an
employee has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential information obtained during the
course of his employment' ") (quoting Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515 n.ll (1980)
(per curiam)). The Chiarella opinion, however, seems to indicate that the duty to disclose or
refrain from trading turns on contractually defined fiduciary duties. See Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) (observing "[tihat the relationship between a corporate insider
and the stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obligation"). But see id. at
246 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that he "would find petitioner's conduct fraudulent
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recasts the gains from freedom and flexibility of contract. At a mini-
mum, managers should be able to end each assertion with the prom-
ise: "Cross my heart and hope to pay civil damages if I'm lying."19
Appreciation that the Macey and Miller standard needs to be a
default rule leads us to consider more carefully the alternative default
of warranting honesty. The question then becomes: Which is the
superior default rule, a "warranty of honesty" or a "no warranty"
default? The ability of corporations to opt for either alternative cru-
cially affects the credibility of corporate speech and, consequently, the
market's response. Once corporations have the option of committing
to honesty, the market will discount severely unwarranted, or "as is,"
statements carrying no corporate warranty.
Macey and Miller seem to appreciate the negative inferences that
the market can draw from silence. They write at length about the "no
comment" dilemma in which corporations bound to honesty, but
wanting to keep merger negotiations secret, must respond "no com-
ment" when asked about a possible takeover.2' The market has come
to interpret the "no comment" response to questions concerning
merger negotiations as a "yes," so that the managers cannot effec-
tively avoid answering the question.21 The authors suggest that
allowing corporate management to lie will solve this problem:
As the information processors within the capital markets have
become more sophisticated, the old fashioned "no comment" state-
ments that management used to make in order to protect confidential
information no longer suffice to protect shareholder wealth. In light
of current decoding techniques among market professionals, manage-
ment must be free to take bolder steps.22
The bolder steps of lying will not, however, eliminate the "no com-
ment" dilemma if corporations retain an option of warranting their
within the meaning of ... Rule lOb-5 . .. , even if he had obtained the blessing of his
employer's principals before embarking on his profiteering scheme") (citation omitted).
19 Ayres & Miller, "I'll Sell It to You at Cost": Legal Methods to Promote Retail Markup
Disclosure, 84 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1047, 1072 (1990).
20 Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 1072-73.
21 Id. at 1073.
22 Id. at 1091. The authors' assertion that current decoding techniques have made the "no
comment" response outmoded is unsupported. If the stock markets were efficient in the 1960s,
why was there not just as much a "no comment" problem then? Macey and Miller do not
provide an account of how or why the technology of the "information processors" became
more sophisticated.
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speech. A manager who denies a merger negotiation but refuses to
warrant the denial will be no better off than one who refuses to com-
ment. As long as the corporation has the option of committing to
honesty, the market will be able to draw the same negative inferences
from the failure to commit that it currently draws from silence or a
"no comment" response. The market will suspect a lie when corpora-
tions fail to warrant the honesty of their managers' statements.
Indeed, the prospect of lOb-5 liability might be insufficient to con-
vince market participants that managers speak honestly. Under a
variant of the SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 23 facts in which valuable
mineral deposits are found, shareholders may prefer that the corpora-
tion lie to the market even if shareholders who sell during the pen-
dency of the misrepresentation can successfully sue for damages.24 In
the terminology of Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, lOb-5
damages may represent a "liability rule" protecting corporate share-
holders' entitlement to honest statements, but not giving market par-
ticipants property protection. 25 Rule lOb-5 damages, in other words,
may not be high enough to commit faithful corporate managers to
honesty. 6 The market, realizing the incentives of managers to lie,27
may consequently discount the truthfulness of speech when damages
flow only to shareholders selling during the pendency of the lie.28 The
23 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
24 For example, assume that the drilling news indicates that the corporate stock is worth
$50 more per share but that lying about the drilling for a month would allow the corporation
to increase the stock value by an additional $20 per share, by buying surrounding land more
cheaply. Then all shareholders would want their managers to lie even if it meant reimbursing
current shareholders (either $50 or $70) who happen to sell during the pendency of the lie.
25 See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1105-06 (1972); Haddock, McChesney & Spiegel, An
Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1990).
26 Indeed, to the extent that 10b-5 liability is insufficient to deter corporate dishonesty,
Macey and Miller should, but do not, argue that viewing such liability as insurance is
consistent with their view of hypothetical ex ante contracting. Under this view, shareholders
would want their managers to lie where necessary to preserve corporate opportunities, but also
would favor compensation for shareholders who sell during the pendency of the lie at an
artificially reduced price.
27 The incentives of managers to lie will be restricted severely even here, however, if they are
held personally liable for misrepresentations. The Securities and Exchange Commission's
(SEC) attempt to limit corporations' ability to indemnify managers for violating federal
securities laws thus may increase the credibility of the corporate warranty of honesty. See
SEC, Release No. 40-13181 (SEC proposal to limit ability to indemnify against lOb-5 liability).
28 The possibility that current lOb-5 damages may be insufficient credibly to commit to
honesty might create incentives for firms to contract for higher potential damages to increase
1991]
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market's unraveling of "as is" speech may not be complete in that a
failure effectively to commit to honesty may not tell the market
exactly how and whether the management is lying. An appreciation
of the parties' ability to contract for alternative legal standards
reveals, however, that there is no easy way to overcome the "no com-
ment" problem. 9
Macey and Miller generally assert that courts should adopt the
legal standard that the shareholders would have -adopted in a hypo-
thetical contract."0 Yet even under this standard it is difficult to argue
that the majority of shareholders would not prefer a default that war-
ranted honesty. If lawmakers chose a default of no warranty, a
majority of corporations likely would adopt resolutions guaranteeing
the veracity of their managers' statements. Only by passing such reso-
lutions could corporations keep the market from severely discounting
their managers' statements. After all, even before the federal securi-
ties laws mandated honest disclosure of financial statements, firms
attempted to precommit to honesty by hiring independent account-
the market's faith. For an analysis of the public policy implications of contracting for higher
damages, see supra note 18.
29 Macey and Miller's analysis also is flawed because it does not incorporate a limiting
principle regarding the size of the lie. Their argument that managers might faithfully lie about
merger negotiations might be extended to more egregious lies about the value of the firm.
Under their analysis, to increase the profitability of making a bid, managers might go further
and lie to depress the already undervalued pre-tender offer price. A corporate lie, for example,
that the company was to incur huge losses could depress temporarily the market price of the
stock and allow the potential bidder to buy at an even larger discount on the open market the
five percent of the target company's shares permitted under the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78m(d)(1) (West 1981 & Supp. 1991). Yet determining the reasonableness of managers'
actions, even under the forgiving business judgment rule, would require consideration of less
restrictive alternatives. See generally R. Clark, supra note 4, at 123-29 (discussing managers'
duty of care and the business judgment rule). There would be at least one less restrictive
alternative to such a hypothetical corporate lie: The sale of treasury stock to a potential bidder
at a discounted price could similarly encourage a bid without the disparate ex post treatment
of shareholders. See Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lock-Ups: Do Target Treasury Sales Foreclose
or Facilitate Takeover Auctions?, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 682, 684 (1990).
30 Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 1068-69. Their analysis of the hypothetical contract
assumes that shareholders would bargain for the contract that would give them the highest
expected value. Diversified shareholders wishing to maximize their minimum return would be
able to choose investments with less systematic risk. According to Irving Fisher, shareholders
would want their managers to maximize expected return for a given level of systematic risk.
I. Fisher, The Theory of Interest 223 (1930). For a summary of Fisher's separation theorem,
see infra text accompanying notes 184-86. For a qualification to this separation result, see
infra text following note 186.
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ants to verify their truth.31 Choosing a default of guaranteed honesty,
then, would save corporations the trouble and cost of adding (and
third-parties the trouble and cost of reading) provisions of the articles
of incorporation.
Even if most corporations would not contract around a "no war-
ranty" default, however, it is equally, if not more, likely that a major-
ity would elect not to contract around a warranty of honesty.
Affirmatively opting for dishonesty would send perverse signals to the
market. If a majority of corporations fails to contract around either
standard, it becomes impossible, as a matter of theory, to choose the
majoritarian rule because the majority of corporate contractors will
accept either default. The indeterminacy of using a majoritarian
standard for default choice is further evidence that a majoritarian
standard is not well-suited to selecting efficient defaults.32 Instead,
efficiency-minded lawmakers should choose the default that mini-
mizes the costs of contracting and failing to contract. If few people
would contract around either the warranty or no-warranty defaults,
the analysis thus quickly devolves to a question about the costs associ-
ated with failure to contract around either rule.
A warranty default is more likely to minimize these "failure-to-con-
tract" costs by providing better informed, therefore more efficient,
reliance by the market. A default of guaranteed honesty that only
could be contracted around with speech-specific disclaimers would
give market participants better information about the "rules of the
game." If shareholders benefit from managers' dishonesty because
the market fails to understand that the corporation has opted for no
warranty, then lawmakers reasonably may establish defaults that pro-
mote better informed communication.33 Like the Federal Trade
31 See Watts & Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm:
Some Evidence, 26 J.L. & Econ. 613, 629 (1983).
32 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 15, at 112-17.
33 Id. at 105. When listeners do not understand the rules of the game, speakers can
fraudulently induce inefficient reliance. For example, in Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis
Surplus Store, Inc., 251 Minn. 188, 86 N.W.2d 689 (1957), the Supreme Court of Minnesota
allowed the defendant to escape liability for refusing to sell fur coats that he had advertised as
"Worth to $100.00" for "$1 Each." Id. at 189, 86 N.W.2d at 690. Perversely, if readers failed
to understand the rules of the game-that such advertisements are too indefinite to constitute
binding offers-then these ineffective offers may fraudulently induce customers to travel to the
store. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 15, at 106.
1991]
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Commission's rule regulating used car sales,34 forcing managers to
state clearly when their statements are to be taken "as is" without
warrant of truthfulness would promote more efficient reliance. Thus,
even if the majority of shareholders would want a no-warranty
default, efficiency-minded lawmakers might choose to impose a war-
ranty default to promote better information about who bears the con-
sequences of dishonesty. 5 In sum, a default that warrants honesty is
superior to a no-warranty default because (1) more firms will contract
around a no-warranty default; and (2) those firms that fail to contract
around a no-warranty default may induce inefficient market reliance
on misrepresentations. To come to any other legal result would be
especially perverse because the prime thrust of federal securities laws
has been encouraging the dissemination of reliable information.36
It is more difficult, however, to establish the exact contours of a
default of warranted honesty.3 7 Whereas I argued above that most
corporations would contract to warrant their public statements about
past "hard" information, it is less certain that corporations would find
it in their interest to warrant statements as to "soft" information-for
example, predictions of future profits. Shareholders might prefer that,
at times, their managers talk about the corporation's future prospects
without the specter of securities fraud liability if the prediction does
not come to pass. Extending the warranty of honesty to cover species
of soft and implicit representation may lead to the problem of ineffi-
cient silencing, which occurs when corporations remain silent not to
preserve a corporate opportunity, but to avoid the specter of ineffi-
cient lawsuits. The SEC responded to such concerns in 1979 by
34 Used Motor Vehicle Trade Regulation Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 455 (1990).
35 At times, efficiency-minded lawmakers should intentionally disregard the preferences of
the contracting parties in establishing default rules. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 15, at
106-07. Such "penalty" or "information-forcing" defaults are chosen to encourage private
parties to contract around them and thereby reveal information about their preferences. Id. at
97. Jack Coffee has employed the notion of information-forcing defaults in arguing that
managers' fiduciary duties should be strengthened. See Coffee, The Mandatory/Enabling
Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1618, 1623
(1989).
36 See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) (holding that the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1933 was intended "to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of
information thought necessary to informed investment decisions") (citation omitted).
37 See infra text accompanying notes 191-94 (discussing competing policy considerations in
formulating lOb-5 damages rules).
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adopting Rule 17538 under the 1933 Act and Rule 3b-63 9 under the
1934 Act, both of which relieve corporations of federal securities
fraud liability for "forward-looking statements"' made with a "rea-
sonable basis" and in "good faith. ' 41 Thus, it is more dicicult to
know, for example, whether corporations would contract for a
requirement that plaintiffs prove defendant scienter to recover dam-
ages for a warranty breach.42
As before, however, efficiency-minded lawmakers should not be
guided solely by hypothetical contract considerations. Majoritarian
default rules may be impossible to fashion or may lead to inefficient
resource allocations. The appropriate contours of a warranty
default-along such dimensions as scienter and materiality4 3-should
be informed more by the debilitating effects of silencing. A default
that warranted honesty might avoid the inefficiency of silencing by
putting listeners on notice that certain species of information are not
susceptible to prosecution under the antifraud provisions.'
Of course, choosing a warranty default will not eliminate the "no
comment" problem. But an immutable rule that allowed corpora-
tions to lie ex post in their shareholders' interests would solve the "no
comment" problem only by denying firms the ability to precommit to
honest speech. Reducing the ability of corporations to speak credibly
to the market induces costs that are likely to outweigh significantly
38 Liability for Certain Statements by Issuers, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1990).
39 Liability for Certain Statements by Issuers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1990).
40 The regulations define the following, inter alia, as forward-looking statements: "a
projection of revenues, income (loss), earnings (loss) per share"; a "statement of
management's plans and objectives for future operations"; and a "statement of future
economic performance." 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175(c)(l)-(3), 240.3b-6(c)(1)-(3) (1990).
41 See R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation 1014-15 (1987).
42 The federal securities laws in effect provide both types of warranty provisions. Rule lOb-
5 actions under the 1934 Exchange Act require proof of defendant scienter, Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976), but actions under §§ 11 and 12 of the 1933 Securities
Act do not. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1988) (dispensing with proof of scienter in favor of
negligence standard for section 11 cases); 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988) (same as to § 12 cases).
43 Restricting the warranty's coverage to knowing or intentional misrepresentations may
serve as an evidentiary substitute for an inquiry into whether the misrepresentation was
material, i.e., likely to induce detrimental reliance. The intentionality of the misrepresentation
(scienter) is itself probative of the fact that at least the speakers thought the issue in question
was material.
44 For example, such a default might force managers to preface portions of oral or written
remarks with the disclaimer: "The following is a forward-looking statement that will not give
rise to causes of action for misrepresentation or omission."
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the cost of the "no comment" problem. This is especially true
because precommitting never to respond to questions in general, or
questions regarding mergers in particular, is a more effective, direct
way for firms to prevent the market from drawing negative inferences
from their refusals to comment.4" If the corporate bylaws mandate
that managers cannot answer questions (that is, that managers must
always give a "no comment" response), then markets cannot draw
negative inferences from a "no comment." As long as firms retain the
option of warranting statements, listeners will draw negative infer-
ences from failures to warrant. The market in a sense appreciates the
moral hazard of selective honesty, just as much as selective "no com-
ments." Thus, only by precommitting never to respond can the cor-
poration deny the market this selective signal.46
Indeed, lawmakers can do more to solve the "no comment" prob-
lem by clarifying how corporations can precommit to silence.
Although certain leading federal cases have appreciated that nondis-
closure of material facts can serve legitimate corporate objectives,4 7
they have failed to offer procedural safe harbors for precommitting to
45 Corporations listed on the national exchanges may have difficulty committing to such a
policy because of exchange rules that mandate disclosure of certain types of information or in
response to exchange requests. E.g., 2 N.Y. Stock Exch. Guide (CCH), Rule 416, $% 2416(a)
& (c) (1989) (binding members and member organizations to respond truthfully to New York
Stock Exchange request for information "deem[ed] essential for the protection of investors
and the public interest"). Moreover, Item 303 of Regulation S-K mandates disclosure of
specified financial and operational information that may preclude precommitments to silence
on those topics. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1990).
46 In her excellent book, Sissela Bok reached a similar conclusion in discussing the policy
consequences of a government's decision falsely to deny a prospective currency devaluation or
tax increase:
[Ilt is far better to refuse comment than to lie in such situations. The objection may be
made, however, that a refusal to comment will be interpreted by the press as
tantamount to an admission that devaluation or higher taxes are very near. Such an
objection has force only if a government has not already established credibility by
letting it be known earlier that it would never comment on such matters, and by strictly
adhering to this policy at all times.
S. Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life 178 (1978). For Bok, precommitting
to silence is a superior way of overcoming the "no comment" problem, the negative inferences
that the press or the market might draw from silence.
47 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 857 n.24 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane)
(recognizing that "it could well be desirable... to preserve when necessary the secrecy of
corporate activity, not to require that an insider possessed of undisclosed material information
reject the offer of a stock option"), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); see also Basic, 485 U.S. at
234-35 (same).
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nondisclosure. In Basic, the plurality explicitly declined to provide
such guidelines:
It has been suggested that given current market practices, a "no com-
ment" statement is tantamount to an admission that merger discus-
sions are underway. That may well hold true to the extent that
issuers adopt a policy of truthfully denying merger rumors when no
discussions are underway, and of issuing "no comment" statements
when they are in the midst of negotiations. There are, of course,
other statement policies firms could adopt; we need not now advise
issuers as to what kind of practice to follow, within the range permit-
ted by law.4"
Because the range of "no comment" policies permitted by law is
unclear, corporations face needless uncertainty in determining
whether charter provisions committing corporations to silence would
be judicially enforced.4 9 Judicial or regulatory rulemaking that estab-
lished safe-harbor procedures for precommitting to silence would be
more effective in solving the "no comment" problem than Macey and
Miller's proposal.
It is important to remember that the "no comment" problem is not
confined to the corporate context.5 0 Buyers and sellers often have pri-
vate information about the value of a commodity that might be valued
by the other side of the contract. Indeed, the "no comment" problem
4 .Basic, 485 U.S. at 239 n.17 (citation omitted).
49 This is particularly true because the affirmative duty of corporations to disclose is vague.
Although courts and commentators often recite that there is no general duty of disclosure, see,
e.g., J. Brown, The Regulation of Corporate Disclosure 31 (1990), federal securities law
requires certain affirmative disclosures of material developments in reports ified with the SEC.
See SEC Enforcement Chief Warns Companies, CPAs on Management Discussion, Analysis,
16 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 95, 95-96 (Jan. 13, 1984). In addition, corporations may have a
duty to speak the full truth and to ensure the continued accuracy of past representations. See
First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952
(1978); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). Several of the national
stock exchanges have adopted rules that largely abrogate the general rule of nondisclosure.
See J. Brown, supra, at 35; see also Jordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987)
(holding that closely held firm had duty to disclose material information to investors whose
holdings it sought to purchase), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988); Minpeco, S.A. v.
Conticommodity Serv., Inc., 552 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that an affirmative
duty exists to disclose manipulative practice).
50 1 am thankful to Tom Jackson, Paul Mahoney and Bob Scott for alerting me to the
broader contractual context.
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arose in the oft-cited case of Laidlaw v. Organ."1 In that case, Organ,
knowing that a treaty ending the War of 1812 would end the British
naval blockade of New Orleans (and thus increase the value of export-
able commodities), entered into an agreement to buy tobacco. 2
Before agreeing to sell the tobacco, an employee of Peter Laidlaw &
Co. asked "if there was any news which was calculated to enhance the
price or value of the article about to be purchased. '5 3 The record
does not reflect, however, what response, if any, Organ made to this
inquiry. 4 Organ thus was faced with the same dilemma that con-
fronted the managers in Basic and the Texas Gulf Sulphur hypotheti-
cal: If Organ denied that he had heard any news, he would have
committed fraud, and if he refused to comment, the buyer might have
drawn negative inferences. 5
One could extend the Macey and Miller argument to apply to just
this type of traditional fraud case as well. Their argument suggests
that an individual who has discovered minerals should be able to lie to
neighboring landowners in negotiating to purchase surrounding land.
Requiring honesty would allow the neighbors to free ride on the origi-
nal investment in drilling. Requiring the initial driller to respond "no
comment" is insufficient to protect this informational investment
because of the negative inferences that the listener would draw from
such a response.56 Following Macey and Miller's logic, courts should
not impose a duty of honesty on the knowledgeable buyer, at least
when an honest "no comment" would undermine efficient investment
in information, because courts should not impose on buyers a duty for
51 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817). See generally Coleman, Heckathorn & Maser, A
Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 639, 692-707 (1989) (discussing "nondisclosure doctrine" in reference
to Laidlaw); Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. Legal Stud. 1, 9-18
(1978) (same).
52 Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 183.
53 Id.
54 Kronman, supra note 51, at 10. The district court found no evidence that Organ "had
asserted or suggested anything... to induce him to think or believe that [the news inquired
about] did not exist." Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 183.
55 Kronman, supra note 51, at 10 n.27. Organ's ability to sell in the face of Laidlaw & CO.'s
inquiry without lying suggests that the "no comment" problem is not insurmountable in all
circumstances. The availability of such means of protecting private information, short of
outright lying, undermines Macey and Miller's argument that misrepresentations are necessary
tools for protecting corporate opportunities.
56 See supra text accompanying note 21.
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which buyers and sellers would not contract. In the hypothetical
drilling case, surrounding landowners should have been willing to
contract ex ante, that is, before the drilling, with the driller either not
to ask any questions or to waive their right to sue for misrepresenta-
tions about the results of the drilling.
Yet to see this analogy to the broader contractual setting is to
refute the underlying argument. In arguing for a contractual founda-
tion for corporate fiduciary duties, the authors ignore the copious
analysis of contractual fraud that universally accepts a duty that
material representations must be truthful.5 7  The time-honored
acceptance of this duty in all other contracts is strong evidence in
favor of the honesty default, and against Macey and Miller's proposal.
B. Good lies and bad lies
Macey and Miller also argue that 10b-5 liability should turn on
whether the prevaricating corporation will internalize the costs of the
misrepresentation. They argue.that if the misrepresentation depresses
the value (or maintains an artificially low value) of the stock, then it
will raise the lying corporation's cost of capital. 8 Misrepresentations
that raise a corporation's cost of capital are good lies because, with
the social costs of lying internalized, managers are well-placed to
assess whether these costs outweigh the benefits to their sharehold-
ers.59 In particular, Macey and Miller maintain that "to the extent
they were believed, the defendants' misrepresentations in Basic caused
the price of Basic shares to trade at artificially low levels, thus raising
the costs to Basic of attracting new capital." 6 Because of this inter-
nalization effect, they argue that telling good lies should not subject
corporations or their managers to fraud liability.61 On the other
hand, misrepresentations that raise the stock price are bad lies, in
their view, because such misrepresentations decrease the lying firm's
cost of capital, thereby allowing the firm to avoid bearing the social
57 See, e.g., R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 97 (3d ed. 1986).
58 Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 1075.
59 Id. at 1075-76.
60 Id. at 1075.
61 Id. at 1076.
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costs of lying.62 As the costs of bad lies are not internalized, the
authors argue that such lies should be actionable.63
This cost-internalization distinction is triply flawed."4 Firms that
artificially lower their stock price may not internalize the social costs
of their lying through higher costs of new capital because: 1) the firm
may not need additional capital; 2) lowering the stock price need not
62 Id. at 1075-76.
63 Id. at 1076.
64 The effect of management misrepresentation on the cost of corporate capital can be more
formally analyzed if the capital markets are both fundamentally efficient and semi-strong form
informationally efficient. See infra text accompanying note 103 (defining and contrasting these
two independent dimensions of efficiency). These assumptions of efficiency imply that the
market value of the firm will equal the market's best estimate, conditioned on available
information, of the net present value of future earnings (PV):
PV (+ryt0
In this equation, "e," represents the expected earnings of the firm in period "t"; "r" represents
the risk-adjusted rate of return (used to discount future earnings), derived from the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). See R. Brealey &. S. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance
173-99 (3d ed. 1988). CAPM predicts that a firm's discount rate will be a function of the
undiversifiable risk associated with owning the firm's assets. This undiversifiable risk is
captured in CAPM by a firm's "3" (beta), the covariance of the firm's returns with the
systematic risk of a well-diversified portfolio. Specifically, CAPM predicts a firm's risk-
adjusted rate of return as:
r=rf + 0(r,-rf)
where "rr" represents the risk-free rate of return; "rm" represents the market rate of return; and
"0i" measures the degree to which the firm participates in (covaries with) the systematic (or
undiversifiable) risk of the market.
Use of these assumptions of market efficiency and CAPM makes possible more formal
evaluation of Macey and Miller's cost-of-capital analysis. A misrepresentation by
management can reduce a firm's value in the net present value equation by either reducing the
expected earnings of the company in future periods (which decreases the numerator in the
equation) or by increasing the firm's risk adjusted rate of return (which increases the
denominator of the equation). Misrepresentations that reduce a firm's stock price can increase
the number of shares that firms need to issue in order to raise a certain amount of funds.
Contrary to Macey and Miller, however, neither effect need raise the capital cost per share or
the capital cost of corporations (r). Misrepresentations that reduce the firm's value by
lowering expected earnings (the numerator effect) need not increase the cost of raising
additional capital because the firm's beta, hence the risk adjusted rate of return (demanded by
market investors), would remain the same. Indeed, even if the misrepresentation increased the
beta on the firm's existing assets (the denominator effect), the cost of raising additional capital
need not increase because the capital cost for a new investment is determined solely by the
riskiness of that individual investment project, the project-specific beta. R. Brealey & S.
Myers, supra, at 198 ("Each project should be evaluated at its own opportunity cost of capital;
the true cost of capital depends on the use to which the capital is put."). Thus, even
misrepresentations that increase the rate at which current investments are discounted should
960
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increase the cost of additional capital; and 3) even if the cost of capital
increases, there is no reason to think that the amount of increase will
be proportionate to fraudulently induced reliance expenditures of
third parties.
Misrepresentations cannot increase a firm's cost of capital if the
firm does not need to borrow from the external capital markets. A
large proportion of corporate investment comes from the accumulated
retained earnings of corporations. In the 1980s, for example, between
sixty and eighty percent of all corporate investment came from inter-
nally generated cash.65 Even if a firm needs to go to an external capi-
tal market, however, there is no reason to think that a
misrepresentation that lowers the stock value will necessarily increase
the cost of capital. Certainly, as a general matter, a decline in the
price of a company's stock need not increase the cost of capital to a
firm, because a healthy firm might continue to borrow at the prime
rate of interest both before and after the false statement.
Finally, even if the corporation's cost of capital increases, there is
no reason to expect that these increased costs will match the costs of
third-party market participants who detrimentally rely on the man-
agement misrepresentation. Lying that either inflates or deflates a
not increase the cost of capital on future investments unless these misrepresentations also
signal a higher beta for the additional projects.
There is another sense, however, in which misrepresentations might be said to increase a
firm's cost of capital, and that is by increasing the amount of firm leverage. By reducing the
market value of a firm, negative news about future earnings will reduce the firm's stock value
more than its bond value (unless the firm is highly leveraged). Negative news then will
increase the firm's leverage by increasing the market valuation of its debt/equity ratio. If the
Modigliani-Miller Irrelevance Theorem is correct, this misrepresentation-induced change in
leverage will have no effect on the firm's cost of capital for the simple reason that a firm's total
cost of capital is not dependent on the amount of the firm's leverage, i.e., debt/equity ratio.
See Modigliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of
Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261 (1958).
Because of the costs of taxation and financial distress and market imperfections, however,
the conclusions of the Modigliani-Miller theorem may not hold, so a firm's costs of capital may
in fact depend on the amount of leverage. Under these circumstances, misrepresentations that
change the amount of leverage affect the costs of a firm's existing capital by either increasing or
decreasing the risk-adjusted rate of return that is demanded by market investors. Management
misrepresentations that increase a firm's leverage under this theory could increase the firm's
implicit cost of a firm's existing capital. Yet, even viewing Macey and Miller's assertion most
charitably, there is no reason to suspect that management misrepresentations will affect either
firm leverage or investment-specific betas in ways that have any nexus with the social costs of
lying.
65 See R. Brealey & S. Myers, supra note 64, at 312-13.
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stock's price will induce third parties to expend resources that would
be avoided if managers had instead credibly committed to honesty.66
If courts accept this good lie/bad lie distinction, then market analysts
will spend more resources attempting to verify unwarranted claims by
management that the firm's stock price is undervalued. In the end,
the amount of these reliance costs likely will be completely independ-
ent of the increased capital costs of prevaricating corporations.
Therefore, the authors' cost internalization argument cannot be
sustained.
The more relevant distinction is not whether the lie increases or
decreases the stock price, but whether market participants clearly
understand the rules of the game. Even lies that inflate a stock's price
should be allowed as long as the market has clear notice that the cor-
porate speech must be taken "as is," with no warrant of veracity. As
long as a corporation warns the market that its managers' statements
may be untruthful, then the market relies on these statements at its
own risk. As long as the rules of the game are clearly known, the
corporation fully internalizes the costs of its decision not to commit to
honesty. For example, if a corporation fails to warrant the statements
of its managers, it will have to expect that the market will discount
statements to the effect that the firm is "in play." This may destroy
the gains of making such statements when they are true, but, counter
to Macey and Miller, this Article argues that such statements should
be allowed as long as the market fully understands whether they are
backed by a warranty of honesty.
The authors' failure to realize this point is all the more surprising
because Jon Macey has made a dramatically similar argument in
other corporate writing.67 For instance, in "Property Rights in Assets
and Resistance to Tender Offers," Macey teamed with David Had-
dock and Fred McChesney to argue that target managers should be
allowed to resist tender offers because, as long as potential bidders
know that resistance is possible, the target corporation will bear the
cost of failing to precommit to passivity.6 8 Failure to precommit to
66 Macey and Miller note, for example, that if management fabricates a rumor that the firm
is "in play" (that it is the object of takeover interest), "[p]otential bidders will waste resources
sifting through the false information." Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 1075.
67 See, e.g., Haddock, Macey & McChesney, supra note 17; Macey & McChesney, supra
note 17.
68 Haddock, Macey & McChesney, supra note 17, at 726.
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passivity puts third parties on notice that the target corporation may
free ride on the investment of the initial bidder by resisting takeover
bids.69 This potential for free riding lowers the likelihood that a
potential bidder will investigate or bid on a firm; consequently, it may
lower the value of a firm that fails to precommit to nonresistance.7'
In the earlier article, Macey and his coauthors concluded that,
because the corporation internalizes the costs of failing to commit, it
is well-placed to decide whether the benefits of resistance outweigh
the costs of failing to commit to passivity.71
This analysis of passivity precommitment bears striking similarity
to this Article's analysis of precommitments to honesty. Corporations
should have the choice of precommitting to honesty; given the choice,
a corporation that does not precommit to honesty puts third parties
on notice that they rely on managers' statements at their own risk. As
with the passivity precommitment choice, the corporation is well-
placed to determine whether retaining the option to lie outweighs the
relative costs of the negative market reaction to the failure to warrant.
In sum, Macey and Miller correctly argue that corporations may at
times find it in their interests to lie to the market. Giving corpora-
tions the ability to opt for honesty, however, drastically reduces the
range of instances where "as is" speech will be profitable. Because
markets will draw negative inferences from unwarranted denials of
merger negotiations, a failure to warrant speech is no better than an
honest refusal to comment. Shareholders might want their managers
to be able to trick the market, but in a world in which firms can
precommit to honesty, the opportunities for profitable unwarranted
misrepresentation are severely limited. Moreover, as a matter of
default choice, the current default of warranting honesty seems supe-
rior to the no-warranty default because few corporations would con-
tract around a warranty of honesty, and those that would might
induce inefficient reliance by market participants who mistakenly rely
on "as is" speech as warranted.72
Instead of distinguishing between good and bad lies, it is more rele-
vant for law to establish a clear default rule-and procedures for con-
tracting around the rule-that informs the market whether a given
69 Id. at 723.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 736.
72 See supra note 33.
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corporation has precommitted to honesty. As long as the market
knows whether the corporation stands behind the truth of its manag-
ers' statements, then the corporation will internalize the costs and
benefits of a failure to commit, and third-party market participants
will avoid inefficient reliance costs.
II. MARKET EFFICIENCY AND CORPORATE SPEECH
The Basic Inc. v. Levinson7a decision implicitly reaffirms the analy-
sis of the last Section: Basic holds, at a minimum, that management
misrepresentations are actionable in the absence of any corporate
agreement to the contrary.74 More controversially, however, Basic
explicitly changes traditional standing requirements by allowing
plaintiffs who have not actually heard the corporate lie to claim that
they detrimentally relied on the integrity of the market to reflect such
information. This Part of the Article distinguishes between two
independent dimensions of market efficiency-"informational" and
"fundamental" efficiency 7-- and shows how different conceptions of
efficiency underlie the plurality and dissenting opinions in Basic.
More generally, this Part argues that beliefs about whether the stock
market is informationally or fundamentally efficient will determine
shareholder preferences concerning corporate speech. The degree of
market efficiency will affect not only shareholders' agency relationship
with management, but also how efficiency-minded lawmakers choose
to regulate a wide range of corporate issues.
73 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (plurality opinion).
74 Because the Court allowed the plaintiffs' case to go forward in the absence of a specific
contractual provision imposing on management the duty to inform the shareholders that
merger negotiations were underway, its holding in Basic suggests that 10b-5 liability is at least
a default rule. It is unclear, however, whether current interpretations of lOb-5 would allow
corporations to contract around a warranty of honesty and, if so, what would be sufficient
contractually to accomplish this end. See, e.g., Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429,
436-37 (7th Cir. 1987) (opining in dicta that even insider trading prohibitions are merely
default rules that corporate employment contracts could negate), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901
(1988).
75 The failure to distinguish between these two dimensions of efficiency has clouded the
discussion of the implications of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) for
corporate law. See Gordon & Koruhauser, supra note 5, at 828 (1985).
[Vol. 77:945
HeinOnline -- 77 Va. L. Rev. 964 1991
1991] Back to Basics
A. Two Dimensions of Market Efficiency
L Informational Efficiency
In accepting the fraud-on-the-market presumption of lOb-5 stand-
ing, the Basic plurality seems to rely largely on the Efficient Capital
Markets Hypothesis (ECMH).76 The ECMH predicts that security
markets will be informationally efficient in that stock prices will
reflect certain classes of existing information." The ECMH supports
a presumption of fraud-on-the-market standing: if "the market price
of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly avail-
able information," it will also reflect material misrepresentations. 8
Thus, even without knowledge of the misrepresentations, former
shareholders can claim that they would have sold their shares at a
different price, but for the misrepresentation.
Whereas this simple theory has plausibility, it requires further iden-
tification of the specific form of efficiency that, as a logical matter,
must underlie the fraud-on-the-market presumption. The ECMH can
take three distinct forms:7 9 The "weak form" postulates that current
stock prices reflect all information concerning past price changes;80
the "semi-strong form" posits that current stock prices reflect all pub-
76 Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47 n.24. In so doing, the Supreme Court followed other scholars-
and the majority of lower federal courts-who have argued that the ECMH provides adequate
grounds for giving shareholders standing even if they have not heard the false corporate
statements. See, e.g., Fischel, Use of Modem Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases
Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. Law. 1 (1982); Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market
Theory, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1143 (1982); Note, Fraud on the Market: An Emerging Theory of
Recovery Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 50 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 627 (1982). But see Black, Fraud on
the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market
Transactions, 62 N.C.L. Rev. 435 (1984) (arguing that traditional concepts of reliance and
causation have validity in certain market contexts). For a representative listing of the lower
courts that have adopted some form of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, see Basic, 485 U.S. at
247 n.25.
77 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47 n.24. ("market professionals generally consider most
publicly announced material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock prices").
78 Id. at 246.
79 Although Eugene Fama championed the terminology and elaborated this tripartite
distinction, he credits Roberts for the original contribution. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets:
A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. Fin. 383, 383 n.1 (1970); see R. Brealey & S.
Myers, supra note 64, at 287 (citing H. Roberts, Statistical Versus Clinical Prediction of the
Stock Market (May 1967) (unpublished manuscript presented to the Seminar on the Analysis
of Security Prices, University of Chicago)).
80 Fama, supra note 79, at 414.
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lic information;"' and the "strong form" posits that current stock
prices reflect not just all public information, but all existing (public
and nonpublic) information. 2
Only the semi-strong formulation of the ECMH supports fraud-on-
the-market standing. 3 The strong-form formulation cannot consti-
tute the basis for the doctrine because it assumes that the stock price
would reflect all existing information, "including the fact that the
statements issued by Basic were false."184 Analogously, the doctrine
cannot be based on the weak-form formulation because that view
guarantees only that the stock price will reflect information about past
prices. Weak-form efficiency would not, by itself, predict that man-
agement misrepresentations affect stock price.85 Thus, to justify
shareholder reliance on false public statements, the fraud-on-the-mar-
ket theory requires acceptance of the semi-strong formulation of the
ECMH.
This insight was originally made by Dan Fischel and reiterated
shortly thereafter by Macey and Miller. 6 Their contribution reveals
with greater clarity the detailed assumptions that the Supreme Court
must accept in upholding the doctrine's use. Both articles, however,
fail to test these assumptions against the newest theoretical and
empirical learning. The empirical section of Macey and Miller's arti-
cle, for example, cites primarily to statistical studies written in the
1960s and 1970s. From this historical vantage, it was not surprising
for the authors to conclude that the semi-strong formulation of mar-
ket efficiency is "'now an accepted working assumption in financial
economics research.' "87 Indeed, in 1978, Michael Jensen, a leading
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 1077 (asserting that "the [Basic] Court was adopting
the semi-strong version of the efficient capital markets hypothesis"); see also Fischel, Efficient
Capital Markets, The Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 907,
911 (1989) (also referring to the Basic Court's adoption of the semi-strong version of the
efficient capital markets hypothesis).
84 Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 1078.
85 Id. at 1079 (noting that, under weak-form ECMH, "plaintiffs could not reasonably rely
on the market price of a security to reflect all publicly available information about the relevant
firm").
86 See Fischel, supra note 83, at 911; Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 1077-79.
87 Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 1082 (quoting I. Lorie, P. Dodd & M. Kimpton, The
Stock Market: Theories and Evidence 73 (2d ed. 1985)).
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finance economist, was able to write that "the efficient markets
hypothesis is the best established fact in all of social sciences.""
In the last five years, however, each formulation of the ECMH has
come under sustained empirical and theoretical attack. Andrei
Shleifer and Lawrence Summers recently wrote:
If the efficient markets hypothesis was a publicly traded security, its
price would be enormously volatile. Following Samuelson's (1965)
proof that stock prices should follow a random walk... and Fama's
(1965) demonstration that stock prices are indeed close to a random
walk, stock in the efficient markets hypothesis rallied.... But the
stock in the efficient markets hypothesis-at least as it has tradition-
ally been formulated-crashed along with the rest of the market on
October 19, 1987.89
In addition, a number of authors have proposed theoretical models of
"noise traders" in which some investors react to nonfundamental
news, or noise, thereby creating nonrandom fluctuations in share
prices.90
Empirically, recent studies have demonstrated a tendency for stock
prices to be "mean-reverting" in the sense that stocks with high
returns today tend to have lower future returns.91 This result directly
contradicts the weak and semi-strong versions of the ECMH by show-
88 Shleifer & Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, J. Econ. Persp., Spring
1990, at 19, 19 (attributing, without citation, quoted statement to Jensen).
89 Id.
90 See, e.g., Black, Noise, 41 J. Fin. 529 (1986); Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider
Trading, 53 Econometrica 1315 (1985). Perversely, noise traders can earn higher expected
returns because they take on more risk, accordingly, the normal operation of market forces
may not drive such traders from the market. See Shleifer & Summers, supra note 88, at 24-25.
Moreover, arbitragers may find it in their interests to mimic noise traders during the initial
state of overbuying or overselling. See De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann, Positive
Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation, 45 J. Fin. 379, 380
(1990). The noise trader model suggests-and the suggestion recently has been proved
accurate-that the discounts on closed-end mutual funds correlate negatively with the returns
of small capitalization stocks, because the investor sentiment of similar individual investors
dominates both markets. See Lee, Shleifer & Thaler, Anomalies: Closed-End Mutual Funds, J.
Econ. Persp., Fall 1990, at 153, 154.
More sophisticated defenses of fundamental efficiency focus, inter alia, on the impact small
changes in expected growth can have on present discounted values of future cash flows. See,
e.g., Barsky & De Long, Bull and Bear Markets in the Twentieth Century, 50 J. Econ. Hist.
265 (1990).
91 See Fama & French, Permanent and Temporary Components of Stock Prices, 96 J. Pol.
Econ. 246 (1988); Poterba & Summers, Mean Reversion in Stock Prices: Evidence and
Implications, 22 J. Fin. Econ. 27 (1988).
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ing that public price information can help predict future price
changes. Other empirical studies document tendencies for short-term
positive correlations in returns on particular stock prices.92
These recent findings call into question Basic's presumption of reli-
ance. Increasingly, Justice Byron White's admonition in dissent rings
true: "For while the economists' theories which underpin the fraud-
on-the-market presumption may have the appeal of mathematical
exactitude and scientific certainty, they are-in the end-nothing
more than theories which may or may not prove accurate upon fur-
ther consideration. '93 Notwithstanding these recent powerful criti-
ques of the ECMH, the legal presumption of semi-strong form
efficiency for stocks traded on the national exchanges may still be
warranted, although the critiques clearly militate in favor of more cir-
cumscribed confidence in it.
2. Fundamental Efficiency
There is a separate dimension of market efficiency that commenta-
tors routinely and mistakenly interchange with the various forms of
the ECMH. The ECMH concerns whether a stock market is "infor-
mationally" efficient: that is, whether the current market price imme-
diately reflects different categories of existing information. Market
efficiency, however, can also refer to whether the market is "funda-
mentally" efficient: that is, whether, conditioned on the information
available, the market price exclusively reflects the underlying, or fun-
damental, profits of the corporation.94 This distinction between infor-
mational and fundamental efficiency dates back at least as far as John
92 See D. Cutler, J. Poterba & L. Summers, Speculative Dynamics, Working Paper No.
3242, Nat'l Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. (Jan. 1990) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association); DeBondt & Thaler, Further Evidence on Investor
Overreaction and Stock Market Seasonality, 42 J. Fin. 557 (1987).
The ECMH is also contradicted by: (1) the tendency of share prices to increase by two to
three percent when a stock is included in the Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index, see Harris &
Gurel, Price and Volume Effects Associated with Changes in the S & P 500 List: New
Evidence for the Existence of Price Pressures, 41 J. Fin. 815 (1986); Shleifer, Do Demand
Curves for Stock Slope Down?, 41 J. Fin. 579 (1986); and (2) the tendency of small stocks to
outperform market indices by a significant percentage each January, see Ritter, The Buying
and Selling Behavior of Individual Investors at the Turn of the Year, 43 J. Fin. 701 (1988); see
also Wang, supra note 5, at 349-62, 377-94 (discussing recent studies undercutting
informational efficiency assumption of ECMH).
93 Basic, 485 U.S. at 254 (White, J., dissenting).
94 See infra note 97.
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Maynard Keynes,95 but often is still muddled or forgotten by legal
commentators who erroneously claim that the ECMH implies funda-
mental efficiency. 96
Fundamental efficiency posits that, conditioned on the information
available, stock prices will reflect the present value of corporations'
expected underlying profits. 97 In a fundamentally efficient market,
news about sunspots or the price of tea in China should not affect the
95 J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money 153-57 (1936).
In a famous passage, Keynes compared the stock market to a beauty contest:
[P]rofessional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which the
competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the
prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the
average preferences of the competitors as a whole, so that each competitor has to pick,
not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to
catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from
the same point of view. It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one's
judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely
thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our
intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be.
Id. at 156. More recently, Nobel-laureate economist James Tobin has admonished that one
form of efficiency does not necessarily imply the other. Tobin, On the Efficiency of the Finan-
cial System, 153 Lloyds Bank Rev. 1, 5 (1984); see Fischel, supra note 83, at 913; Wang, supra
note 5, at 344.
96 Two insightful legal articles, however, do appreciate and explicate this distinction.
Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 825 (defining informational and fundamental
efficiency as "speculative" and "allocative" efficiency); Wang, supra note 5, at 344-49 (defining
analogous efficiency terms of "information-arbitrage" and "fundamental-valuation"). Much of
the accompanying text at most elaborates their previous insights.
Fischel, supra note 83, at 912-13, makes a similar distinction between "trading-rule
efficiency" and "value efficiency." Trading-rule efficiency incorporates informational efficiency
by focusing "on the speed with which market prices reflect publicly-available information and
whether the price reaction to new information is without bias." Id. Bias in a price reaction
cannot be measured, however, without relation to some benchmark of fundamental or intrinsic
value, so Fischel's efficiency categories are not entirely distinct. As defined by Fischel, trading-
rule efficiency implies that "it is impossible to devise a trading rule that systematically
outperforms the market (net of transaction costs) absent possession of inside information." Id.
at 913. By focusing on the absence of profitable arbitrage opportunities, this definition fails to
ensure either informationally or fundamentally efficient markets. Trading-rule efficiency, for
example, cannot distinguish between the semi-strong and strong form versions of the ECMH.
Although arbitrage is an important mechanism of market efficiency, see Gilson & Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 553 (1984), the absence of
profitable arbitrage opportunities is not sufficient to guarantee that stock prices will reflect
existing information or fundamental value, see infra note 108.
97 More formally, fundamental efficiency requires that a stock price equal the present
discounted value of a corporation's expected earnings, where future earnings are discounted by
the risk-adjusted rate of return of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. See supra note 64 (net
present value equation). Expectations about earnings are formed on the basis of information
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stock price of IBM.98 Taken to its extreme, fundamental efficiency
implies that a decision by the president of Northwestern University to
sell a huge block of Xerox stock for the sole and stated purpose of
building a new football stadium should not affect the price of that
stock. Because the sale provides no information about the underlying
profits of Xerox, the market should have ready, willing, and able buy-
ers to soak up this unexpected supply of shares without letting the
stock price drop a fraction of a point.99
In addition, fundamental efficiency determines how much a stock
price should move in response to a piece of news. If a corporation
trading in a fundamentally efficient market unexpectedly earns an
extra one million dollars, then its stock price should increase by one
million divided by the number of outstanding shares.Y00 The empiri-
cal finding that stock prices exhibit substantially greater volatility
than underlying dividends suggests that the market may respond to
fundamental news in nonfundamental ways.1° 1 Pieces of news may
that is available to the market. The degree of informational efficiency determines what existing
information is "available" to the market. See infra text accompanying note 106.
98 Authors have claimed that sunspots correlate with the business cycle. See, e.g., Jevons,
Commercial Crises and Sun-Spots, in Investigations in Currency & Finance (2d ed. 1909);
Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 807; Sheehan & Grieves, Sunspots and Cycles: A Test
of Causation, 48 S. Econ. J. 775 (1982).
99 Thus, taken to this extreme, fundamental efficiency implies that the market demand for
stock at its fundamental price should be horizontal. See Shleifer, supra note 92, at 579; Stout,
Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99
Yale LJ. 1235, 1236-37 (1990).
100 In this regard, the stock market's response to the Texaco-Pennzoil litigation, for
example, poses a conundrum for those who believe in fundamental efficiency. On Friday,
April 10, 1987, Texaco filed for bankruptcy after a Texas jury awarded Pennzoil $10 billion in
damages against Texaco for Texaco's interference with Pennzoil's attempted takeover of Getty
Oil. On the next trading day, Monday, April 13, the stock price of both Texaco and Pennzoil
dropped significantly. See Mnookin & Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency:
Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 Va. L. Rev. 295, 332 (1989). The news of Texaco's
bankruptcy reduced the total value of Texaco and Pennzoil's assets by approximately $3.4
billion. See Summers & Cutler, Texaco and Pennzoil Both Lost Big, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14,
1988, at F3, col. 1. While some have attributed this result to "market error," see Cutler &
Summers, The Cost of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress: Evidence from the Texaco-
Pennzoil Litigation, 19 RAND J. Econ. 157, 158 (1988), others have found it consistent with
stock market efficiency. See Mnookin & Wilson, supra, at 311-15 (arguing, inter alia, that the
rational expectation that Texaco would be involved in a lengthy and costly bankruptcy
reorganization accounts for the huge equity losses).
101 See Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in
Dividends?, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 421 (1981) for the first and most controversial analysis of this
issue. Shiller's work has sparked a rich debate. See, e.g., Kleidon, Bias in Small Sample Tests
970
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have both fundamental and nonfundamental components in that
nonfundamental speculation may cause the market to overreact. The
market, alternatively, may overreact to this piece of fundamental
information. Regardless of the semantic characterization, however,
this phenomenon refutes the notion that the market is fundamentally
efficient because it shows that the market does not move solely to
reflect the fundamental content of available information.
Informational and fundamental efficiency in a sense concern the
market's supply of, and demand for, information. The degree of
informational efficiency represents a "supply-side" attribute that
determines what categories of information are made available to the
market. In contrast, the degree of fundamental efficiency is a
"demand-side" attribute that determines which categories of available
information the market values. Informational efficiency determines
which information is available to the market; fundamental efficiency
determines how the market reacts to this available information. The
market's equilibrium reaction to news will be simultaneously deter-
mined by both types of efficiency, but, as with other goods, the mar-
ket's supply and demand of information can be analyzed
independently.
The two dimensions of efficiency are diagrammed in Figure 1. The
vertical and horizontal lines divide types of existing and future infor-
mation that might affect a stock price. 10 2 Figure 1 depicts how infor-
mational and fundamental efficiency can be viewed in part as
"excluder" theories because they exclude certain classes of informa-
tion from having a potential impact on future stock price changes.
The divisions along the vertical axis capture the different formulations
of the informational efficiency of the ECMH. The weak-form hypoth-
esis posits that existing price information (Area A) has no effect on
future price changes; the semi-strong form hypothesis posits that
of Stock Price Rationality, 59 J. Bus. 237 (1986); Kleidon, Variance Bounds Tests and Stock
Price Valuation Models, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 953 (1986); Marsh & Merton, Dividend Variability
and Variance Bounds Tests for the Rationality of Stock Market Prices, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 483
(1986).
102 Area B, for example, consists of nonfundamental, public information. An example of
such information, with respect to IBM's stock, would be the public disclosure that President
Ronald Reagan dyed his hair. By comparison, Area D consists of fundamental, nonpublic
information. Examples of such information include undisclosed information concerning firm-
specific innovations (such as cloning a new hormone) or macroeconomic variables (such as last
week's Federal Reserve Board activity).
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existing public information (Areas A, B, and C) has no effect on
future price changes;10 3 and the strong-form hypothesis posits that
both existing public and private information (Areas A, B, C, D, and
E) have no effect on future price changes.
The notion of fundamental efficiency, however, cuts this informa-
tional pie in a different way. The left-hand column (Areas A, B, D,
and F) includes different types of nonfundamental information, and
103 In Figure 1, the subset of all existing public information would include the subset of
existing (past) price information, because information about a traded stock's past price is
quintessentially public.
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the right-hand column (Areas C, E, and G) includes different types of
fundamental information.'04 The divisions along the horizontal axis
capture whether the market is fundamentally efficient. The funda-
mental hypothesis posits that nonfundamental information (Areas A,
B, D, and F) has no effect on future stock price changes;10 5 but under
the nonfundamental hypothesis, either fundamental or nonfunda-
mental information (Areas A through G) may affect future price
changes. The informational dimension of efficiency determines what
information is available for use by the market; the fundamental
dimension of efficiency determines what types of information the mar-
ket considers relevant. 6 Accordingly, the informational dimension
of efficiency cannot speak to the effects of future pieces of news on
stock. 07 Fundamental notions of efficiency, however, can make pre-
dictions about the effects even of future information: if the market is
fundamentally efficient, then even today we can say that tomorrow's
sunspot will not affect stock prices.
Thus, in discussing the efficiency of the stock market, one must dis-
tinguish between the two competing types of stock market efficiency
and make independent assessments about whether (and to what
degree) the market is informationally and fundamentally efficient.108
104 The analytic distinction in Figure 1 between fundamental and nonfundamental
information is useful in practice to distinguish between core nonfundamental news (including
sunspots and the director's zodiac sign) and core fundamental news (including macroeconomic
variables such as interest rate changes and firm-specific variables such as a new patent). As
discussed above, information with some relevance to underlying profitability, therefore
considered fundamental, but that causes the market price to change more (or less) than
warranted by fundamental considerations alone, might have both a fundamental and a
nonfundamental component.
105 In Figure 1, only the nonfundamental column of information includes the subset of
information concerning existing (past) price information. Past price information does not
constitute fundamental information as it contains no information about a firm's future
underlying profitability.
106 The legal concept of "material" information is closely related to this definition of
fundamental efficiency. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)
(stating that omitted information is material if there is "a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important" in making an investment decision).
107 There could not exist a "super-strong" formulation positing that future information
would have no effect on future stock prices because, under the various formulations of the
ECMH, information not currently available can affect a future stock price.
108 It is possible that extreme forms of informational efficiency may preclude fundamental
inefficiency so that the assessments of these two dimensions of market efficiency may not be
completely independent. For example, if the market is strong-form informationally efficient
with regard to all existing information, fundamental inefficiency may be inconsistent with
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For example, in Figure 1, a belief that the market is fundamentally
efficient and semi-strong form informationally efficient would imply
that only the types of information represented in Areas E and G could
affect future stock prices. A belief in fundamental efficiency would
exclude all nonfundamental information (Areas A, B, D, and F), and
a belief in semi-strong form informational efficiency would eliminate
all existing public information (Areas A, B, and ).
Without drawing the crucial distinction between fundamental and
informational efficiency elaborated above, the respondents in Basic
pointed to the stock market crash of October 19, 1987, as a reason to
question market efficiency. 109 But the dramatic fall of the market on
Black Monday provides different sorts of evidence with regard to the
separate issues of fundamental and informational efficiency. Black
Monday provides strong and direct evidence that the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) is not fundamentally efficient because it is impossi-
ble to locate any information that could be responsible for a twenty-
two percent devaluation of corporate assets on that single day, or a
thirty-six percent devaluation from the market's peak in late August.
Although some have tried, 110 it is difficult to argue that news concern-
ing the present value of future underlying profits accounted for the
fall. 111
In sharp contrast, the dramatic fall does not refute the notion that
the market is informationally efficient. After all, the various formula-
notions of arbitrage among a small group of fundamental traders. Cf. supra note 96
(discussing Fischel's notion of "trading-rule" efficiency). Even small amounts of informational
inefficiency may be sufficient to generate the possibility of nonfundamental pricing. For
example, not knowing the amount of liquidity selling or portfolio insurance can lead to price
movements that are inconsistent with fundamental efficiency. See infra text accompanying
notes 129-38.
109 See supra text accompanying note 3.
110 See, e.g., Lee, Efficient Market Theory Lives!, Wall St. J., May 6, 1988, § 1, at 20, col. 4.
I1I See Lowenstein, Casting Out a Plague of Speculation, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1988, at
A27, col. 2 (attributing 1987 stock market crash to speculators); Wolman, Efficient Market
Theory Stumbles, Fin. Times, Apr. 15, 1988, at 116, (stating that, contrary to ECMH, there
are no "economic developments to justify" the 1987 stock market crash). The present value of
future profits might be sensitive to changing estimates of the growth rate, see Barsky & De
Long, supra note 90, at 265, or the risk-adjusted interest rate, see supra note 64. It is possible
that fundamental information regarding these variables could have accounted for some of the
stock movement. But if the information "coming to market" on those October days is
consistent with fundamental efficiency, the New York Stock Exchange should exhibit much
more volatility on many other days when the market receives similar signals but does not react
as cataclysmically.
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tions of informational efficiency posit that the current stock price will
quickly reflect certain classes of information. It is hard to deny that
the stock market prices were changing quickly. Once we discard the
notion that the market is fundamentally efficient, it is possible that the
stock exchanges were rapidly incorporating nonfundamental news
into the stock valuations. In sum, the sudden market plunge on Black
Monday refutes the fundamental efficiency of the market but may
support the notion that the stock market is informationally
efficient.' 12
3. Refinements of Informational and Fundamental Efficiency
Theories of informational and fundamental efficiency can be refined
in two important ways reflecting more particularized treatment of
both time and information. First, the benchmark theories of informa-
tional efficiency posit that the stock market price will instantaneously
reflect certain types of information. Even if we reject the notion that a
certain class of information is immediately absorbed into the price of
stock, we could believe that a strong tendency exists for the market to
reflect such information within a certain period of time. Thus, even
though it is unlikely that the market is instantaneously strong-form
efficient," 3 nonpublic information may have a strong tendency to
become public through various market and social forces, 1 4 so that we
could believe that stock prices will reflect any nonpublic information
that has existed for, say, twelve months." 5
Secondly, the degree of informational and fundamental efficiency
can be further detailed by more finely distinguishing between different
classes of information. 1 6 Just as the ECMH distinguishes between
three different classes of information to establish three different forms
of informational efficiency, we may have grounds for further subdivid-
112 See Fischel, supra note 83, at 915.
113 See, e.g., Grossman & Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient
Markets, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 393, 395 (1980).
114 See, e.g., Klein, Merger Leaks Abound, Causing Many Stocks To Rise Before the Fact,
Wall St. J., July 12, 1978, § 1 at 31, col. 1.
115 See infra text accompanying notes 159-66 (analyzing implications of a strong-form
efficient market "with one period lag").
116 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 96, at 556 (observing that "scholars have pressed
the weak, semi-strong, and strong form categories beyond their original service as a
classification of empirical tests into more general duty as a classification of market responses to
particular kinds of information").
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ing each efficiency dimension. For example, stock prices may reflect
certain types of public information (concerning, for instance its own
prices, or the interest rate on Treasury Bills) faster than other types of
public information (concerning, for example, Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait). In such circumstances, saying that the market is or is not
semi-strong form informationally efficient provides little help.
Instead, better policy might result from a more particularized under-
standing of how fast the market assimilates various types of
information.
Our appreciation of fundamental efficiency might also benefit from
further subdividing the horizontal axis of Figure 1. Within the class
of nonfundamental information, one can easily distinguish informa-
tion concerning the liquidity of the stock market from other types of
nonfundamental information. Suppose, for example, that upon wak-
ing up tomorrow we learn that a bomb has destroyed half the trading
capacity of the New York Stock Exchange for the next year. 117 This
information is not fundamental because it does not pertain to the
underlying profits of the traded stocks."" It is likely, however, that
stock prices will fall because investors in thin markets will probably
include a liquidity discount in their valuation of the security."19 The
liquidity of stock ownership has been repeatedly extolled as a funda-
mental attribute of the corporate form;120 it is thus hardly surprising
that impairing ownership liquidity reduces stock value.
117 One can readily think of other discrete events that might affect market liquidity: the
federal government might impose a significant transfer or turnover tax on stock sales; a stock
exchange might limit the volume of stock traded under certain conditions; or an individual
corporation could issue rights that lost value if the stock were traded or changed hands too
many times per period.
118 Information bearing on liquidity could be thought to be "fundamental" if we abandon
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) as the sole determinant of the appropriate discount
rate. In a multifactored asset pricing model, liquidity could affect the risk-adjusted rate of
return demanded by investors, including the liquidity risk of investment. Ross, The Arbitrage
Theory of Capital Asset Pricing, 13 J. Econ. Theory 341, 351 (1976). The discount rate, in
turn, affects the net present value of an investment. See supra note 64. Regardless of how one
characterizes these liquidity effects, their presence will change the objectives of managers
seeking to maximize the corporation's current stock price.
119 See R. Conroy & K. Eades, The Pricing Characteristics of Convertible Preferred Stock 3
(Feb. 1991) (unpublished manuscript) (asserting that common stock "commands a liquidity
premium" over less liquid convertible shares).
120 See R. Clark, Corporations 14 (1986); Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89, 111 (1985).
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Market-liquidity effects on stock prices represent a special class of
nonfundamental valuation, because they are not susceptible to tradi-
tional types of arbitrage. Most theories of nonfundamental valuation
are based on speculative models in which an expectation of a higher
resale price primarily motivates investors.121 On this assumption of
investor motivation, nonftmdamental pricing theories posit that
expectations of future price increases can lead speculators to drive the
current stock price above its fundamental value.122 These speculative
deviations from fundamental values are often called "bubbles."' 123
The term is evocative because speculative deviations, like bubbles,
tend to "pop" as investor arbitrage eventually punctures the expecta-
tions of ever-increasing prices.12 4  Market-liquidity effects on stock
prices are not, however, speculative bubbles that can be punctured by
arbitrage. Changes in the liquidity or thickness of the market should
reduce resale opportunities. As long as there is a positive probability
that investors will need to sell their shares while the market is illiquid,
the stock price will be discounted.125
The stock market may have so much excess liquidity, however, that
news about relative amounts of illiquidity never impairs resale oppor-
tunities and accordingly has no effect on stock prices. Two recent
examples powerfully contradict this view and suggest that illiquidity
discounts can significantly affect stock prices. Market illiquidity
seemed to play a prominent role in the 1987 market collapse as the
securities markets' limited capacity to handle the demand for trades
led to dramatic price reductions. When the New York Stock
121 See, e.g., Feiger, What is Speculation?, 90 Q.J. Econ. 677 (1976); Harrison & Kreps,
Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations, 92 Q.J.
Econ. 323 (1978).
122 See Stiglitz, Symposium on Bubbles, J. Econ. Persp., Spring 1990, at 13, 13.
123 According to a recent definition, "if the reason that the price is high today is only
because investors believe that the selling price will be high tomorrow-when 'fundamental'
factors do not seem to justify such a price-then a bubble exists." Id. at 13.
124 See Blanchard, Speculative Bubbles, Crashes and Rational Expectations, 3 Econ. Letters
387, 388 (1979); Stiglitz, supra note 122, at 14.
125 Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence Summers detail the limits of arbitrage: "[Tihere are
several reasons ...to assume that arbitrageurs have short horizons. Most importantly,
arbitrageurs have to borrow cash or securities to implement their trades, and as a result must
pay the lenders per period fees." Shleifer & Summers, supra note 88, at 21; see also Shleifer &
Vishny, Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 148, 152-53
(1990) (stating that arbitragers will avoid long-term arbitrage because of the greater risks and
positive externalities involved and because it takes longer to reap the gains of such arbitrage).
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Exchange hit its capacity constraint, stock prices took a free-fall. 126
Hitting the stock market's trading capacity did not constitute funda-
mental news because it did not relate to any of the corporations'
underlying profitability, yet investors' reaction to news of illiquidity
seems to have caused, at least in part, the market's reaction. 27 This
nonfundamental explanation eerily parallels the precipitous price
drops on Black Tuesday, October 29, 1929: "When the stock ticker
ran late, investors panicked and sold their holdings."' 12
A number of recent articles have shown that beyond these
exchange capacity constraints, markets may exhibit illiquidity because
uninformed investors may be unwilling to absorb an unanticipated
supply of stocks to be sold.129 For example, in an elegant model, Gen-
notte and Leland have shown that "[i]f there are relatively few
informed investors, markets may be much less liquid (and therefore
more fragile) than traditional models predict when unobserved supply
shocks occur."' 30 In their model, one small group of investors (price-
informed investors) may, like insiders, receive some information
about the firm's future fundamental value; another small group of
investors (market-makers) may receive some information about the
amount of "liquidity selling" that is taking place;' 3 1 and the largest
group of investors can only observe the current stock price. In this
model, if an unusually large supply of stock to be sold exists, and if
the market-makers cannot ascertain whether this supply comes from
126 See Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms (1988) [hereinafter
the Brady Report].
127 The market's response to illiquidity may have had both speculative and nonspeculative
components. It would be hard to argue that the 22% decline on Black Monday was caused
solely by a nonspeculative illiquidity discount.
128 White, The Stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929 Revisited, J. Econ. Persp., Spring
1990, at 67, 68 (1990); see J.K. Galbraith, The Great Crash (1988); C. Kindleberger, Manias,
Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (1978).
129 See Gennotte & Leland, Market Liquidity, Hedging, and Crashes, 80 Am. Econ. Rev.
999 (1990); Grossman, An Analysis of the Implications for Stock and Futures Price Volatility
of Program Trading and Dynamic Hedging Strategies, 61 J. Bus. 275 (1988); J. Grundfest,
When Markets Crash: The Consequences of Information Failure in the Market for Liquidity
(Sept. 1990) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association); C.
Jacklin, A. Kleidon & P. Pfleiderer, Underestimation of Portfolio Insurance and the Crash of
October 1987 (unpublished manuscript) (Aug. 1990).
130 Gennotte & Leland, supra note 129, at 1001.
131 Liquidity selling is prompted by the need of stockholders to exchange their shares to
raise cash for current consumption. Obviously, liquidity selling tells us nothing about the
fundamental value of the firm.
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price-informed investors or liquidity sellers, then the market may
become illiquid at current price levels and even at price levels substan-
tially below the current price. This illiquidity is caused by the reluc-
tance of uninformed investors to buy from sellers who may have
information that the fundamental value of the firm has fallen:
If supply changes are unobserved, all investors will revise downward
their expected future price and will absorb the increased supplies only
after price has fallen substantially. Price-informed investors will have
somewhat greater elasticity of demand than uninformed investors,
since they receive independent information about future prices. How-
ever, their contribution will be minimal if they are few, or if their
price information is very noisy.
How... market-makers... contribute to market liquidity...
depends on the quality of the supply signal they observe. When their
signal has low precision, they side with the uninformed investors....
Because their actions are not aggressive and their numbers are rela-
tively small, market-makers with poor supply information will reduce
volatility only marginally.132
If the vast majority of shareholders cannot tell whether the seller is
selling for fundamental (insider) or nonfundamental (liquidity) rea-
sons, then small amounts of unexpected supply can generate large
price falls as uninformed investors refuse to buy from someone who
potentially has inside information of bad fundamental news.
The existence of unobserved portfolio insurance can dramatically
exacerbate this liquidity effect.' 33 Portfolio insurance represents a
dynamic hedging strategy whereby investors try to maintain a syn-
thetic put option on their investment.134 A synthetic put option to sell
one hundred shares of stock is obtained by selling a certain proportion
of one hundred shares "short"' 35 and by investing the proceeds from
this short sale and an additional amount (equalling the cost of the
132 Gennotte & Leland, supra note 129, at 1007.
133 Sanford Grossman first explicated this point. See Grossman, Insurance Seen and
Unseen: The Impact on Markets, J. Portfolio Mgmt., Summer 1988, at 5.
134 A "put" is an option to sell a security at a stated "exercise' price. Buying a share and a
put eliminates the down-side risk of investment because, if the share price drops below the
put's exercise price, the investor can exercise the option to ensure the receipt of at least the
difference between the exercise price and the depressed share price. The price of this insurance
is the price of the put
135 The percentage to be sold short is commonly referred to as the "hedge ratio" or the
"option delta" and can be derived from the Black-Scholes option pricing formula. See R.
Brealey & S. Myers, supra note 64, at 485-86.
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put) into a safe interest-bearing security such as Treasury Bills. 136 To
maintain a synthetic put over time, however, requires the put owner
to adjust the proportion of shares shorted as the underlying price of
stock changes. Crucially, as the price of stock falls, the owner of a
synthetic put needs to sell more shares short. 137
As Sanford Grossman originally suggested, portfolio insurance may
have a destabilizing effect because of the inability of the broad class of
uninformed shareholders to distinguish between fundamental sales
and the sales of investors with portfolio insurance who are selling
merely to readjust their synthetic puts. A small price fall (caused by
either fundamental news or unobserved liquidity selling) might there-
fore trigger a price fall akin to Black Monday as portfolio insurers try
to sell increasing numbers of shares to readjust their synthetic puts.
As Gennotte and Leland describe, uninformed investors might ration-
ally attribute this unexpected portfolio insurance sell-off to insiders or
smart money, who have superior access to information about firms'
fundamental value: "Observing these falling prices, uninformed inves-
tors (rationally) concluded that highly negative information must
have been received by the price-informed investors.... [T]he majority
of investors stood on the sidelines or bought only limited amounts,
consistent with a conviction that something unknown but terrible
must have happened."' 1  In sum, poor information about the sources
of liquidity or dynamic hedging selling can cause markets to be rela-
tively illiquid at or near current prices. Information regarding these
sources of selling consequently can have a dramatic impact on future
price changes in ways that contradict traditional notions of funda-
mental efficiency.
136 Investors who want to hedge their investment by buying the equivalent of 100 shares and
a put option on 100 shares can accomplish this by buying shares plus a synthetic put:
buy 100 shares
sell (delta) X 100 shares
buy specified amount of safe securities, which on net is equivalent to:
buy (1 -delta) X 100 shares,
buy specified amount of safe securities, where delta is the option delta. See supra note 135.
137 A rough intuition for why this is true can be gleaned from the fact that, as the price of
the underlying stock decreases, the put option goes further "into the money," i.e., it
increasingly gains value. In the case of extreme price drops, owning a put deep in the money is
equivalent to owning a short share because the owner knows with a high degree of certainty
that he or she will exercise the option. Because of this equivalence, as the put goes deeper into
the money, the proportion of shorted sales (the option delta) approaches 100%.
138 Gennotte & Leland, supra note 129, at 1012.
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One important regulatory response to Black Monday only rein-
forces the importance of these illiquidity effects in determining stock
prices. Since the 1987 crash, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the Chicago Board of
Trade (CBT) have all instituted "circuit-breaker" regulations that
halt trading for a prescribed period after a significant fall in market
price.13 9 For example, if the Dow Jones Industrial Average drops by
250 points on a single day, a NYSE rule mandates a one-hour halt in
the trading of all stocks. 140 Figure 2 charts the use of a circuit breaker
on the CME.14 1 On Monday, July 24, 1990, when contracts for the
Standard and Poor's Stock Index futures fell twelve points (the
equivalent of 100 points in the Dow Jones industrial average), the
CME circuit breaker halted trading at lower levels for thirty
minutes. 142
Many suggest that the price movement in Figure 2 demonstrates
the success of circuit breakers: the trading halt allowed the market to
"cool off and digest information." 143 The precipitous decline in the
price of futures contracts may have been fueled, however, by the exist-
ence of the circuit breaker and the illiquidity it mandates. The early
declines in futures contract prices increased the probability that the
circuit breaker would be activated. This increased probability had a
destabilizing effect as the market discounted the security's value
because of the impending possibility of illiquidity. It follows that the
prospect of illiquidity could have caused the circuit breaker to have a
magnetic effect, pulling down security prices that came too close:
"when prices approach a circuit-breaker level, the drop accelerates in
a rush to sell before the mechanism is triggered." 144 Thus, the precip-
itous price decline in Figure 2 provides additional evidence that
139 See S. Rep. No. 300, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 37-38 (1990). Congress has recently given
the SEC explicit authority to mandate such circuit breakers. See Market Reform Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-432, § 6, 104 Stat. 963 (1990) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78(k)(1)-(4) (1988)).
140 2 N.Y. Stock Exch. Guide (CCH), % 2080B, Rule 80B (1990).
141 Figure 2 is taken from Shapiro, Circuit Breakers: Maybe They Work, Maybe They
Don't, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1990, at F7, col. 1.
142 Id. at F7, col. 2. See Chicago Mercantile Exch. Rule 4002(1) (1991).
143 Shapiro, supra note 141, at F7, col. 3. For discussion of the assumptions about
informational and fundamental efficiency that underlie the adoption of circuit-breaker
regulation, see supra text accompanying notes 109-12.
144 Shapiro, supra note 141, at F7, col. 4.
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nonfundamental information about market liquidity can affect market
price. 45
B. Basic Views of Efficiency
An understanding of the analytical distinction between informa-
tional and fundamental efficiency allows reconciliation of the dispa-
rate judicial interpretations of fraud-on-the-market doctrine. In the
Basic opinion itself, the plurality and dissenting opinions do not join
issue on the same concept of market efficiency. Justice Harry Black-
mun's plurality opinion focuses on informational efficiency: "Recent
empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress' premise that the
market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all
publicly available information.""
In dissent, Justice Byron White, joined by Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, rejects the conclusion of market efficiency, but in language
that sounds in terms of fundamentals:
For in adopting a "presumption of reliance," the Court also assumes
that buyers and sellers rely-not just on the market price-but on the
"integrity" of that price. It is this aspect of the fraud-on-the-market
hypothesis which most mystifies me....
To define the term "integrity of the market price," the majority
quotes approvingly from cases which suggest that investors are enti-
tled to "'rely on the price of a stock as a reflection of its value.'" But
the meaning of this phrase eludes me, for it implicitly suggests that
stocks have some "true value" that is measurable by a standard other
than their market price. While the Scholastics of Medieval times pro-
fessed a means to make such a valuation of a commodity's "worth," I
doubt that the federal courts of our day are similarly equipped.' 47
145 It follows from the foregoing analysis that the Brady Report's response to the 1987
market crash is particularly benighted. See Haddock, An Economic Analysis of the Brady
Report: Public Interest, Special Interest, or Rent Extraction?, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 841 (1989).
If, as suggested above, market illiquidity was at least one precipitating factor in Black
Monday's free fall of stock prices, then the report's suggestions of increasing the exchanges'
capacity and instituting uniform circuit breakers are at cross purposes. Id. at 858, 860-61.
Increasing the exchanges' capacity would reduce the likelihood of illiquidity discounts, but
imposing circuit breakers would increase the likelihood of such illiquidity and, as discussed
above, might generate a magnet effect that pulls stock prices down from fundamental value.
146 Basic, 485 U.S. at 246 (plurality opinion).
147 Id. at 255 (White, J., dissenting) (citations and footnotes omitted).
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Justice White, in essence, argues that the fundamental efficiency of the
market is unknowable because courts cannot determine, independent
of share price, the value (underlying profits) of the corporation. 148
In other words, the plurality argues in favor of the fraud-on-the-
market presumption because it concludes that well-developed stock
markets are informationally efficient; the dissent argues against the
presumption because it cannot conclude that the market is fundamen-
tally efficient. Yet, as argued above,149 these assessments are not
mutually exclusive: it is possible that the market is informationally
efficient but not fundamentally efficient. 5 0 Thus, the question left
unresolved by the Justices in Basic must be answered: Which form of
efficiency is relevant to the fraud-on-the-market doctrine of lOb-5
standing?
As a logical matter, only the semi-strong form of informational effi-
ciency is required to demonstrate that management misrepresenta-
tions affect stock prices. Justice Blackmun implicitly recognizes this
in a footnote: "For purposes of accepting the presumption of reliance
in this case, we need only believe that market professionals generally
consider most publicly announced material statements about compa-
nies, thereby affecting stock market prices."'' Thus, even in a mar-
ket that is not fundamentally efficient (and accordingly pays attention
to information unrelated to a corporation's underlying profits), an
informationally efficient market will tend to generate detrimental
price effects when corporations lie.
148 See Fischel, supra note 83, at 919-20. The process of measuring fundamental efficiency
can become particularly scholastic when one considers that nonfundamental speculation can
distort the market price of a corporation's underlying assets. Consider, for example, a
corporation that invests only in tulip bulbs. If the spot price for bulbs is determined solely by
speculation-the desire to resell the bulbs for a higher price-is it proper to say that a stock
market that reflects the higher value of the corporation's underlying assets is fundamentally
efficient? For a description of the "tulipmania" that overtook the Netherlands in 1637,
sending the price of a single bulb to more than $16,000, see C. Mackay, Memoirs of
Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (1852).
149 See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
150 Indeed, one might take this lesson from the sudden fall in prices on Black Monday. See
id.
1S1 Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 n.24. It is here that Blackmun most effectively counters the new
learning on the failings of the ECMH. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92. To justify
the Basic presumption, one need not accept that all forms of public information are completely
absorbed into the current stock price; one only need accept that such information tends to
affect price. See Fischel, supra note 83, at 911.
984
HeinOnline -- 77 Va. L. Rev. 984 1991
Back to Basics
Justice White's analysis does, however, pertain to the amount of
damages. For if the market lacks fundamental efficiency (or if this is
unknowable), courts lose their ability to determine what the price
would have been but for the corporate misrepresentation. 152 Nor can
the Court simply say that understating a windfall profit translates to a
particular stock price change. Thus, whereas informational efficiency
may justify the plurality's presumption, Justice White's legitimate
concerns with the market's fundamental efficiency give defendants yet
another basis for rebutting the size of the misrepresentation effect. 153
C. Nonfundamental Objectives of Corporate Speech
Appreciating the fundamental and informational dimensions of
market efficiency also allows a clearer conception of why shareholders
would want their managers to speak to the market. The initial Sec-
tion of this Article, analyzing whether shareholders would precommit
to honesty, dealt in a sense with the quality of corporate speech. This
Section turns to the issues of the quantity and timing of corporate
speech to investigate when shareholders will demand speech from
their managers.5
Law and economics models of the corporation have proposed two
alternative characterizations of what shareholders would like their
managers to do. One characterization asserts that shareholders will
want managers to maximize the underlying profits of the corporation,
or, more precisely, the present discounted value of future profits. 155
The other characterization suggests that managers should maximize
152 However, even if courts can determine how a nonfundamental market would react to
misrepresentations, it is unclear whether securities law should, as a matter of policy, promote
speculation concerning nonfundamental information by making that determination.
Materiality standards should exclude nonfundamental information in order to discourage
speculation on socially inefficient information such as sunspots. By promoting (or at least not
proscribing) nonfundamental fraud, law can help drive this genre of speculation from the
market, which would result in efficiency gains to society at large. This possibility is addressed
infra, notes 180-83.
153 See generally Carney, The Limits of the Fraud on the Market Doctrine, 44 Bus. Law.
1259 (1989) (discussing other ways to rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption).
154 For an insightful discussion of similar issues, see B. Black, The Timing of Corporate
Disclosure (draft Aug. 14, 1987) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association).
155 See, e.g., Bayley, Rule 19c-4: The Death Knell for Dual-Class Capitalizations, 15 J.
Corp. L. 1, 25 (1989); Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of
Shareholder Choice, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 78 (1988).
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the present value of the corporation's stock. 1 6 Although corporate
scholars often use these two managerial objectives interchangeably,
the objectives are only identical if a corporation's stock is traded on
an exchange that is both fundamentally efficient and strong-form
informationally efficient.
Proving that the two managerial objectives will diverge if the mar-
ket is not fundamentally efficient is straightforward. For example, if
the stock price turns on nonfundamental information (such as the size
of accounting profits or charitable contributions), then managers
maximizing share price would have reasons to trade-off underlying
economic profits to manipulate these variables. This form of funda-
mental inefficiency also could cause shareholders to demand corpo-
rate expenditures on speech about these topics. To be sure, managers
will speak to the market for fundamental reasons: to stimulate
demand or reduce costs, especially the costs of capital.1 7 The point
here is that when stock price is not determined solely by fundamen-
tals, shareholders will demand some corporate speech for nonfunda-
mental reasons. The existence of fundamental inefficiency thus
changes the managerial objectives demanded by shareholders.
Even if the market cares only about fundamentals, however, share-
holders might still demand that managers pursue objectives other
than maximizing profits. Most basically, shareholders might want
managers to spend money on conveying information that will reduce
the shareholders' need inefficiently to duplicate and verify their man-
agers' statements. The company can often provide corporate informa-
tion more cheaply because it has better access to the information and
because it only needs to research the information once (saving individ-
ual shareholders the cost of developing the information separately). 158
Thus, shareholders rationally might demand audited financial state-
ments even if auditing reduces underlying profits.
156 See R. Brealey & S. Myers, supra note 64, at 22-23.
157 See generally supra note 64 (discussing limited ways in which corporate
misrepresentations will affect the cost of capital in a fundamentally efficient market).
158 See Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70
Va. L. Rev. 669, 684 (1984) (stating that "[flor most information about a firm, the firm itself
can create and distribute the knowledge at less cost than the shareholders"); cf. Coffee, Market
Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 Va. L. Rev. 717, 733
(1984) (asserting that when information is made available from a central information
repository, "[r]ival firms do not need to incur expenses to produce essentially duplicative
data").
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The following Section focuses on an independent reason why share-
holders might demand corporate speech that reduces the underlying
profits of the firm. If the market is not informationally efficient in the
strong-form sense, shareholders may want their managers to expend
corporate resources (and accordingly reduce corporate profits) for the
sole purpose of changing the stock price. In other words, sharehold-
ers may have a nonfundamental demand for corporate speech in that
they will want their managers to reveal fundamental information to
the market even when the process of revelation reduces the underly-
ing profitability of the firm. When the stock market is not strong-
form informationally efficient, then, shareholders may want their
managers to trade-off underlying economic profits to increase the cur-
rent stock price.
L The Stock Price/Profit Trade-off
To illustrate this with a simple model, consider a corporation
driven by market forces to precommit to honesty. 159 Assume that the
corporation's stock is traded on a market that is fundamentally effi-
cient and informationally efficient in the semi-strong sense. Assume
further that the market is strong-form efficient "with a one period
lag."'" Strong-form efficiency with a one period lag means that, in
any period, managers discover information not immediately available
to the market, but that the market will costlessly learn about this
"news" one period later and will then reflect this news in the market
price.
We now ask whether shareholders would ever want their manage-
ment to spend money to talk credibly to the market.1 6 1 For example,
159 As discussed above, corporations that fail to precommit to honesty may bear the costs of
negative inferences as the market discounts the statements of its managers. See supra text
accompanying notes 30-32. Alternatively, one could assume that courts have held that federal
law immutably mandates managerial honesty. Cf. supra note 36 (stating that congressional
purpose behind 1933 Securities Act was to ensure truthful disclosure of material information).
160 This definition grows out of the previous discussion that suggested that theories of
informational efficiency could be further refined by gauging the time it takes a given class of
information to be reflected in a stock's price. See supra text accompanying notes 113-16.
161 In dramatizing this trade-off between the size of underlying profits and the accuracy of
the share price, this model suppresses any effects that corporate speech may have on
underlying profits. Speaking to the market may simultaneously enhance a profitable
opportunity and increase the price of the stock. See supra text accompanying note 157. For
the purposes of this stylized example, however, the "news" is not disclosed to improve the
profits of the firm.
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if the corporation's managers stumbled upon information that unex-
pectedly improves the profitability of the firm, would the shareholders
want their managers to spend money to tell the market about it? For
specificity, assume that the news indicates the current stock market
price is "D" less than fundamentals would indicate and that managers
can credibly communicate the news to the market for a per share
price of "C." To complete the model, assume that the corporation's
shareholders are homogeneous and that a given shareholder has a "P"
probability of needing to sell his or her shares in any given period, 162
which is simply to say that P is the probability that a given share-
holder will be a liquidity seller.'63
If managers do not speak, the current share price will not change,
and the stock price will increase by D in the next period when the
information becomes available to the market. Because a chance exists
that each shareholder will sell his or her share during the first period,
the expected value of this information without corporate speech is
P(O) + (1 - P) D, where shareholders who sell (with probability P)
in the first period receive no benefit, and those who sell (with
probability (1 - P)) in the second period after the news leaks to the
market receive D. With corporate speech, the expected value of the
information is D - C, which represents the fact that communication
immediately increases the value of the corporation by D less C, the
real expenditure in making the revelation. 164 Corporate speech
ensures that all shareholders, even those who sell their stock in the
initial period, share in the good news, but causes all shareholders to
bear the cost of disclosure.
Under these conditions, shareholders would want their managers to
expend resources if D - C > (1 - P)D, which simplifies to PD >
C. 165 This inequality implies that managers will sacrifice underlying
162 These unexpected demands for funds in any period generate a random need to sell. See
Shleifer & Summers, supra note 88, at 23. Several formal economic models of insider trading
explicitly rely on the existence of liquidity sellers. See, e.g., Glosten & Milgrom, Bid, Ask and
Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. Fin.
Econ. 71, 77 (1985); Kyle, supra note 90, at 1315.
163 See supra note 131.
164 This analysis assumes that shareholders who sell in subsequent periods will expect to
earn either D (if there is no corporate speech) or D - C (if there is). The random-walk
hypothesis (weak-form informational efficiency) suggests that current price is the best
predictor of future price. See Fama, supra note 79, at 414.
165 Using algebra, D - C > (1 - P) D can be rearranged to yield:
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profits when the expected benefits from disclosure (PD) outweigh its
costs (C). This will tend to be true the more the market undervalues a
stock (the larger D is), or the more likely shareholders will sell their
shares in a given period (the larger P is). 166
This extremely stylized example shows that shareholders ex ante
may want management to reduce the fundamental value of their com-
pany in order to increase the short-term stock price. The inequality,
PD > C, contradicts the received wisdom that shareholders would
want their managers simply to maximize underlying profits. In that
vision of the corporate principal-agent relationship, shareholders
would place blinders on their managers so that managers would not
be distracted by the stock price and instead would keep their eyes
focused solely on profits.
The failure of strong-form informational efficiency changes this
hypothetical agency contract. Shareholders care not only about maxi-
mizing the corporate pie, but also about how the residual returns are
divided among shareholders.1 67 When the market lacks strong-form
informational efficiency, management decisions about corporate
speech will affect the division of residual returns, as shareholders who
need to sell in the short term will have lower returns when manage-
ment fails to disclose an undervalued price. Thus, small amounts of
informational inefficiency in the stock market can cause shareholders
to demand corporate speech that reduces fundamental value. 68
The inequality also suggests a testable hypothesis that the amount
of corporate speech will increase as the probability of liquidity sales
increases. Structural characteristics such as the stock's rate of trading
turnover or the percentage of institutional ownership may be good
proxies for this probability. If stockholders "buy and hold," they will
D- C > D -PD
-C> -PD,
PD > C.
166 The inequality compares the marginal expected benefits of disclosure (PD) with its
marginal cost (C).
167 The conflict between shareholders in dividing the corporate pie was at the heart of the
Transamerica liquidation. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956),
modifying 135 F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir.
1947), rev'g 63 F. Supp. 243 (D. Del. 1945).
168 This result will hold strictly in this simple model only if the unexpected piece of good
news in nondiversifiable. For a larger discussion of how diversified shareholders might
demand corporate speech that reduces underlying profits, see infra text accompanying notes
187-90.
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want their managers to spend less time and money talking to the mar-
ket because there is a lower probability P that they will sell in any
given period. Conversely, shareholders that turnover their stock reg-
ularly (high P) will want their managers to spend more money on
speaking to the market when the firm is undervalued.
The costs of credible corporate speech go well beyond the direct
costs of advertisements and financial audits. As Macey and Miller
argue, one cost of early disclosure may be an impaired ability to
exploit corporate opportunities such as the opportunity to buy sur-
rounding land on the cheap after a successful Texas Gulf-like drill-
ing.119 Moreover, the leading explanations for a host of financial
decisions-including dividend policy and the issuance of debt and
securities-turn on "signaling" theories under which the managers'
financial decisions signal to the market the underlying value of the
corporation.170 Stock splits, for example, may signal a company's
expectation of higher dividends: This is consistent not only with the
empirical findings that stock prices increase when stock splits are
announced,171 but also with the finding that when companies fail to
increase their dividends after a stock split, their stock prices fall to
levels prevailing well before the split.172
These empirical findings suggest that companies face a trade-off
between communicating with a stock split the prospect of high future
dividends today or waiting for information about the value of future
dividends to be revealed at a later point in time. For high-value firms,
this parallels the trade-off in the preceding model: weighing the costs
169 Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 1071.
170 See, e.g., Bhattacharya, Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and "The Bird in the
Hand" Fallacy, 10 Bell J. Econ. 259 (1979); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 96, at 603;
Gonedes, Corporate Signaling, External Accounting, and Capital Market Equilibrium:
Evidence on Dividends, Income, and Extraordinary Items, 16 J. Acct. Res. 26, 30 (1978);
Leland & Pyle, Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial
Intermediation, 32 J. Fin. 371 (1977); Myers & Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment
Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. Fin. Econ. 187
(1984); Ross, The Determinants of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach, 8
Bell J. Econ. 23 (1977); Watts, The Information Content of Dividends, 46 J. Bus. 191 (1973).
In game-theoretical terms, a financial policy can represent a credible signal of high firm
value, if it is cheaper for high-value firms to undertake that policy. E. Rasmusen, Games and
Information: An Introduction to Game Theory 206 (1989); see Ayres, supra note 18; Ayres,
Playing Games with the Law, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1291 (1990).
171 Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10
Int'l Econ. Rev. 1 (1969).
172 Id. at 16-17.
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of communication versus the benefits of a higher current stock
price.17 The primary implication of growing signaling literature for
this discussion is that the costs of communicating information about
fundamental value are not insignificant.174 As a result, when markets
lack strong-form informational efficiency, managers' objectives
diverge significantly from simple maximization of underlying profits.
2. Negative Inferences About Expected Events
The simplifying assumptions of the trade-off model can be compli-
cated in several ways. In the initial example, the good news was unex-
pected, so that the market could not draw inferences from the
corporation's failure to speak. In other contexts, however, the market
will expect management to have nonpublic information (about, for
example, the continued development of announced research). In such
situations, the market may draw negative inferences from manage-
ment's failure to speak. The market would reason that the corpora-
tion would, by the inequality PD > C, speak only if the stock were
sufficiently undervalued-so silence connotes an increased probability
that the firm is overvalued. The market would discount accordingly
its assessment of the stock's value.175
This analysis suggests that larger market discounts will correspond
to the larger probability of liquidity selling. Because shareholders
with a high probability of liquidity selling will want their managers to
speak about even smaller amounts of undervaluation, the market will
realize that there is an even larger probability that the stock is over-
valued. 176 If the market severely discounts share price in response to
173 By contrast, for low-value firms the false signal of a stock split raises current price above
fundamental value but lowers future value (possibly below pre-split level). The temptation to
send a false signal will be especially great when the low-value firm has shareholders with a high
probability of selling during the interim period. This suggests a testable hypothesis that stock
splits will send stronger signals when the splitting corporation has low-turnover shareholders,
because these shareholders will be less likely to send false signals. Similar "turnover"
hypotheses could be constructed for other financial policies, such as issuing stock or paying
dividends, that signal information about a firm's underlying profits.
174 See, e.g., R. Brealey & S. Myers, supra note 64, at 294 ("A stock split seems an expensive
way to send the message.").
175 For a similar argument regarding additional stock issues, see Myers & Majluf, supra
note 170, at 188.
176 For example, if the corporation has a small stock turnover (which implies a low
probability (P) of sale in any given period), then, by the inequality PD > C, the corporation
seldom will speak about the stock's undervaluation. In this situation, silence will not cause a
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this form of selective silence, shareholders may find it advantageous to
precommit to silence in certain specified situations, even when the
stock is significantly undervalued.
3. Heterogeneous Shareholders
The stylized trade-off model also assumed that shareholders were
homogeneous. Relaxing this assumption, however, may create an
even greater demand for corporate speech that has a nonfundamental
objective. For example, the inside information to which managers are
privy in the initial period may not become known to the entire market
simultaneously. Market specialists may play a role akin to palace
guards who are situated to learn about inner workings of a corpora-
tion before the general market.'77 In terms of our earlier formula-
tion, 178 it may be that if managers do not speak in the initial period,
these palace guards will learn about news in the second period, and
that the general market will only acquire the information costlessly in
the third period. Under these assumptions, the probability (P) that
shareholders sell in a given period may not be exogenous to the
model: when the palace guards hear the news in the second period,
they will start to buy the underpriced stock. Palace-guard purchases
will bid up the stock's price,17 9 thus increasing the number of share-
holders who sell in the second period (before the information is
known to the entire market).'8 0
significant stock price discount, because the management will fail to speak about all but the
most significant pieces of good news. The failure to speak about good news counterbalances
much of the failure to speak about bad news. In other words, when P is low, management
censors almost all of the information, so the market cannot draw negative inferences from
silence. In contrast, when P is high, management will censor only the bad news, and the
market will assume that no news is bad news. See Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488 (1970).
177 See Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an
Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & Econ. 311, 314-19 (1987).
178 See supra text accompanying notes 159-63.
179 See Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 113, at 393; Stout, supra note 99, at 1278.
180 The term "palace guards" suggests, however, that the market specialists may perform a
valuable function in return for their profits from proximity. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra
note 96, at 569-79; Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 113.
The palace-guard effect also provides one of the strongest arguments for allowing
corporations contractually to sanction insider trading. Although insider trading may represent
a windfall profit to the insider, from the standpoint of social efficiency the only result worse
than a windfall to insiders would be the wasting of real resources by palace guards to discover
information that insiders could transmit more cheaply to the market. Nevertheless, the palace-
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This palace-guard effect would increase dramatically shareholders'
demand for corporate speech because shareholders would seek assur-
ance that palace guards would not receive a disproportionate amount
of the gains from correcting the price of undervalued stock. Share-
holders may demand expenditure of resources (C) on corporate
speech in the first period, not only because it distributes the informa-
tion more quickly, but because it distributes the information more
uniformly than the alternative process by which news leaks to the
market.
The major result of this Section has been that when stock markets
are not fundamentally and informationally efficient, shareholders may
want their managers to pursue objectives other than merely maximiz-
ing underlying profits. Yet, in moving away from profit maximization
as the unitary objective of management, we interject the possibility of
disparate objectives for different shareholders. Shareholders of corpo-
rations with palace guards having earlier aeess to fundamental infor-
mation are likely to demand more corporate speech, as are
shareholders who are likely to sell their stock for liquidity reasons.
If different types of shareholders hold a given corporate stock,
whose objectives should management pursue? The Tiebout model of
local government offers the classic economic solution to this prob-
lem.181 Under this theory, corporations should, at their inception,
announce their planned quantity and quality of corporate speech,
guard effect does not compel the conclusion that shareholders would want to allow insider
trading. When the ex ante effects of insider trading on management behavior are small,
shareholders may be able more effectively to disempower the palace guard by increasing the
amount of direct corporate speech.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) considered the issue of whether management has an
effective option of speaking directly to the market. The Dirks opinion sanctioned the use of
insider trading precisely when the Court found that efforts to speak directly to the market had
been unavailing. Id. at 662-67. Consistent with the palace-guard theory, the Supreme Court
allowed insider trading to displace the profit-taking of the palace guard when direct corporate
speech could not accomplish this same end.
Lucian Bebehuk and Chaim Fershtman have analyzed formally the effects of insider trading
in a series of working papers. See L. Bebehuk & C. Fershtman, The Effects of Insider Trading
on Insiders' Choice Among Risky Investment Projects, Harvard Program in Law and Econ.,
No. 75 (Sept. 1990); L. Bebchuk & C. Fershtman, The Effect of Insider Trading on Insiders'
Reaction to Opportunities to "Waste" Corporate Value, Harvard Program in Law and Econ.,
No. 76 (Sept. 1990).
181 Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956); see also
Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1043, 1086 n.152 (1988) (applying Tiebout model to corporate context).
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then allow shareholders to sort themselves by voting with their feet-
investing in those corporations that provide their preferred package of
speech and divesting their holdings in corporations that do not. Yet,
if heterogeneity persists after shareholders have sorted themselves, l"2
this Section illustrates that managers will have difficulty being faithful
to masters who have differing objectives. Market inefficiency conse-
quently will change the default objectives of management in ways that
turn on the preferences of the underlying shareholders. It will be
especially difficult for courts to fill the gaps in the corporate contract
when shareholders have different preferences. At a theoretical level,
it is difficult to decide how "tailored" the judicial "off-the-rack" rules
should be and whether they should change as the ownership of under-
lying shares changes. 8"
Irving Fisher and James Tobin both provided "separation" theo-
rems that drastically simplify the lives of corporate managers in these
situations. 18 4 In a nutshell, these theories suggest that managers need
not take into account the risk and diversification preferences of their
shareholders because shareholders themselves can obtain these prefer-
ences through individual borrowing and investment decisions.18 5
Under the separation theorems, management need only maximize the
underlying profits of the corporation.186 This Section has argued that
when securities markets are not efficient in the strongest sense of the
word, these separation theorems fail and shareholders demand
nonfundamental behavior from their managers, particularly regarding
corporate speech. It may be, however, that diversified shareholders
182 Different types of shareholders may fail to separate themselves into the preferred
corporate contracts for a number of reasons. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 15, at 113.
Complete separation in the Tiebout model, for example, depends on the existence of a sufficient
number of corporate speech investments, which may not exist in equilibrium.
183 As a practical matter, many of the speech decisions (including financial signaling) of
corporate management are governed by the business judgment rule that, as currently
interpreted, will sustain virtually any corporate speech policies. See R. Clark, supra note 4, at
123.
Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960), addressed the broader theoretical issue
of whether default rules should be tailored to characteristics of the particular parties. In
Lewis, the Court held that most promisors would contract for set-off rights against third-party
beneficiaries, but that labor contracts differed; accordingly, a different default should apply.
Id. at 468-70.
184 See I. Fisher, supra note 30; Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior Toward Risk, 25
Rev. Econ. Stud. 65 (1958).
185 See R. Brealey & S. Myers, supra note 64, at 161.
186 See id. at 22.
994 [Vol. 77:945
HeinOnline -- 77 Va. L. Rev. 994 1991
Back to Basics
will not demand corporate speech when managers have private infor-
mation indicating that the firm is undervalued. If some firms fail to
disclose good news and others fail to disclose bad news, then a diversi-
fied investor engaged in liquidity selling 187 would, on average, sell at
the correct price. The possibility of diversifying part of the risk of
selling at an undervalued price would correspondingly reduce the
nonfundamental demand for corporate speech and resurrect the oper-
ation of the separation theorems.
The risks created by informational inefficiency, however, are not all
completely diversifiable.188 In particular, the risk that palace
guards-who have access to inside information before the general
market-will be on the other side of a transaction is not diversifi-
able.1 9 This inability to diversify palace-guard risks means that even
diversified shareholders will have an interest in preempting palace-
guard trading through expedited revelation of insider information. 19°
Therefore, the presence of palace guards may cause shareholders,
diversified and undiversified alike, to demand costly corporate disclo-
sure, even if such disclosure entails a reduction in the firm's underly-
ing profits.
D. Efficiency Implications for Structuring Corporate Law
Stock market inefficiencies will also affect the content of legal rules
governing corporate organization. If markets tend to be fundamen-
tally inefficient, lawmakers may decide to use materiality and damage
standards to deter speculation and to control deviations of market
prices from fundamental value. For example, by restricting the defini-
tion of "materiality" to cover only fundamental information,
lawmakers could reduce the value of nonfundamental information.
By allowing misrepresentations about nonfundamental information, a
revised materiality standard might be effective in reducing certain
forms of speculation. A more fundamental interpretation of material-
187 Absent lump-sum broker commissions, liquidity selling by diversified shareholders
would usually imply a pro-rata sale of the entire portfolio of securities.
188 For example, unanticipated news of undervaluation will not be diversiflable because, by
virtue of the fact that the news is unanticipated, the market will be unable to discount or inflate
the ex ante price to reflect the probability of its occurrence.
189 For a general discussion of diversification and its limits, see R. Brealey & S. Myers,
supra note 64, at 140.
190 See supra notes 179-80.
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ity, however, would conflict with the current judicial definition of
materiality, which includes information that "a reasonable share-
holder would consider" in making an investment decision:191 court
decisions like Texas Gulf Sulphur have held that "speculators and
chartists of Wall and Bay Streets are also 'reasonable' investors enti-
tled to the same legal protection afforded conservative traders."'192
The issue of efficient lOb-5 damages in a fundamentally inefficient
market is even more perplexing. Imagine that management misrepre-
sents a fundamental fact that would depress a fundamental stock
price by ten dollars, but speculative overreaction causes the market
price to drop by thirty dollars. Should shareholders who sold during
the pendency of the undiscovered lie be awarded ten dollars or thirty
dollars? One response would be to attempt to divine the hypothetical
contract that the corporation and its shareholders would have estab-
lished ex ante. 93 Under this analysis, lawmakers should establish a
default rule that allows shareholders to recover for nonfundamental
price movements (thirty dollars). Shareholders would demand funda-
mental information and would be damaged by not being able to sell at
what otherwise would have been the market price (although this firm-
specific risk is potentially diversiflable). But, as before, efficiency-
minded lawmakers might prefer an immutable rule that limits dam-
ages to fundamental value (in this case, ten dollars), if such a rule
deters socially inefficient speculation. 194
191 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). In Basic, the Court
extended this definition of materiality to the Rule lOb-5 context. 485 U.S. at 232.
192 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (citing H.R.
Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 11 (1934)), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
193 See supra text accompanying note 30.
194 For a recent description of the ill effects of excessive speculation, see Lowenstein, supra
note 111.
The same policy concerns are at issue with statutory restrictions on appraisal right remedies
for publicly traded corporations. Beginning in 1967, a number of states adopted "stock
market" exceptions to appraisal right statutes that made appraisal only available to investors
whose shares are not listed on a national exchange. See Stout, supra note 99, at 1286. If the
national exchanges are not fundamentally efficient, lawmakers need to decide whether
shareholders are entitled to nonfumdamental overvaluation or should be limited to
nonfundamental stock price undervaluation. In either case, the hypothetical contract analysis
may conflict with efforts to eliminate the externality of speculation.
996 [Vol. 77:945
HeinOnline -- 77 Va. L. Rev. 996 1991
Back to Basics
CONCLUSION
This Article has addressed two issues at the heart of Basic Inc. v.
Levinson: (1) whether corporate misrepresentation constitutes a
breach of management's fiduciary duty to shareholders; and (2)
whether the efficiency of the capital markets can replace the tradi-
tional requirement of detrimental reliance on the misrepresentation in
Rule lOb-5 litigation. In answering the first question, this Article has
emphasized the contractual nature of management's agency relation-
ship with shareholders. The fiduciary duty to tell the truth or pay
damages is akin to a contractual warranty of honesty. Corporations
should be allowed to waive this warranty, but in contracting around
this default rule, management should be forced to inform listeners
that the corporate speech is unwarranted, "as is" speech. This Article
has argued that market forces will ensure that few firms opt for
unwarranted speech, at least as regards hard information. To be sure,
corporations that warrant their management's speech will encounter
significant "no comment" problems, in that the market will draw
undesired inferences from managers' silence or "no comment"
responses (to questions concerning, as for example in Basic, merger
negotiations). Instead of solving the "no comment" problem by lying,
corporations have committed, and would continue to commit, con-
tractually to remaining silent. Indeed, the enabling function of corpo-
rate law can be best furthered not by making it easier for corporations
to lie without consequence, but by making it easier for corporations to
precommit to silence.
In answering the second question, this Article has distinguished
between informational and fundamental efficiency. Markets that are
informationally efficient quickly supply certain classes of information
to the market. Markets that are fundamentally efficient only demand
and react to information relating to a corporation's underlying profits.
A central thesis of this Article has been that these two dimensions of
market efficiency are theoretically independent-in that security mar-
kets can exhibit one type of efficiency with or without exhibiting the
other. Black Monday, for example, strongly evidences that the stock
market is not fundamentally efficient, but if anything supports a claim
of informational efficiency. The Basic opinion itself underscores the
failure of analysts adequately to distinguish between informational
and fundamental efficiency. The plurality argues in favor of the
fraud-on-the-market doctrine because the market is informationally
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efficient; the dissent argues against the doctrine because fundamental
efficiency is unknowable. Regarding Basic, this Article has argued
that (1) both factual premises may be true (as Black Monday sug-
gests); (2) semi-strong form informational efficiency is an adequate
ground for fraud-on-the-market standing; and (3) the dissent's skepti-
cism concerning fundamental efficiency raises legitimate concerns
about calculating plaintiffs' damages.
Beyond this analysis of Basic, this Article has explored the relation-
ship between stock market efficiency and management's agency rela-
tionship with shareholders. In a world where security markets are
both informationally and fundamentally efficient in the strongest
senses, the default fiduciary duties created by corporate law and
desired by shareholders would be quite straightforward: managers
should maximize the present discounted value of the firm profits. The
leading corporate finance text puts this especially bluntly: "Managers
do not need to know anything about the personal tastes of their share-
holders and should not consult their own tastes. Their task is to max-
imize net present value." 195
Either type of capital market inefficiency, however, will change
both the fiduciary duties desired by shareholders and the structure of
efficient corporate law. A simple model has shown that even a failure
of strong-form informational efficiency can lead shareholders to trade-
off underlying profits for a more accurate short-term stock price.
Essentially, in markets that are not strong-form informationally effi-
cient, shareholders will want their managers to expend real resources
to speak credibly to the market when the firm is undervalued. The
costs of corporate speech include not only traditional expenses of oral
and written communication, but the wide range of financial behavior
(which includes stock splits, dividends, and leverage decisions) that
are increasingly thought to "signal" management's beliefs about the
corporation's prospective profitability. Similarly, when security mar-
kets are not both fundamentally and informationally efficient, man-
agement's objective is not merely to maximize underlying value.
Shareholders may be willing to pay for management speech as a sub-
stitute for market efficiency. Moreover, this new corporate objective
will turn on the underlying tastes and characteristics of the sharehold-
ers. Thus, without strong-form informational and fundamental effi-
195 R. Brealey & S. Myers, supra note 64, at 22.
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ciency, managers can no longer toil as profit plow-horses with
blinders to the level of its stock price and the preferences of their
shareholder masters.
The two Parts of this Article suggest that, in regulating corporate
speech, lawmakers need to appreciate more fully the implications of
contractual precommitment and stock market efficiency. For courts
especially, these two insights will merge when filling gaps in the cor-
porate contract because the content of the hypothetical agency rela-
tionship will often turn on whether and to what extent the stock
market is informationally and fundamentally efficient.
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